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Contemporary United States has witnessed a gradual shift of political
responsibilities to local communities. This shift creates opportunities for a greater sense
of democracy among individuals in local communities. This dissertation explores how
elements of social capital and civic engagement support participatory democratic
processes, and ultimately improve the quality of democracy for individuals. The central
premise of this research is that democracy satisfaction includes the ability to influence
decisions for individual and community benefits. Thus individuals who possess social
capital and actively participate in civic life are likely to experience democracy
satisfaction.
Trust is specified as a primary social capital measure. Thus, the extent to which
“generalized trust” and “particularized trust” account for differences in the levels of
individual satisfaction with democracy is examined. A parsimonious typology is
developed in which four categories of trusters (total trusters, general trusters, particular

trusters, and skeptics) are delineated and empirically tested. Three categories of civic
engagement; local political, representative and altruistic civic engagement are also
differentiated and tested for their explanatory value for democracy satisfaction. To
achieve this, data from the 2000 American National Election Study were used in logistics
regression models.
The study confirms the notion that while trust is important when it comes to
democracy satisfaction, it is generalized trust (total and general trusters), rather than
particularized trust (particular trusters, and skeptics) that is more important in predicting
democracy satisfaction.
The results also show that not all forms of civic engagement predict democracy
satisfaction. While representative civic engagement and giving to charity have positive
effects on democracy satisfaction, local political civic engagement and volunteering time
do not significantly predict satisfaction with democracy. With reference to altruistic civic
engagement, results show that giving to charity has a positive effect on democracy
satisfaction, but not volunteering time. It is concluded that participatory democracy is
impeded in communities with strong particularized trust and limited generalized trust.
The study points to futures research opportunities to ascertain the extent to which types of
trust and civic engagement are pertinent factors in explaining development efforts in local
communities that are deficient in civic culture and participatory democracy.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction
This dissertation explores how elements of social capital and civic engagement
support participatory democratic processes, and ultimately improve the quality of
democracy for individuals. Previous studies exploring issues of social capital, civic
engagement, and democracy focus on how trust, social networks and civic engagement,
support democratic participation and improve the quality of governance, politics and
democracy at macro levels (Gibson 2001; Helliwell and Putnam 2000; Inglehart 1999;
Joslyn and Cigler. 2001; Krishna 2002 a and b; Putnam 1993; Uslaner 1999a, 1999b;
Brehm and Rahn 1997). There are few studies focusing on individual socialpsychological, micro level contextual analysis of social capital, civic engagement, and
democracy satisfaction. The central premise of this research is that democracy
satisfaction includes the ability to impact decisions for individual and community
benefits. Thus individuals who possess social capital and actively participate in civic life
are likely to be satisfied with democracy.
The dissertation uses micro-level constructs such as formal and informal
connections, trust, civic action, beliefs in collective action, and the motivation and ability
to act, (which are embedded in the operationalization of social capital and civic
1

2
engagement) to explain individual level satisfaction with democracy. Further, it
theoretically positions individual level analysis within the structure of local place,
conceptually linking micro-level social processes with wider macro-level processes. This
is relevant because although no individual can “own democracy” per se, he or she can
“own” a feeling of satisfaction with the way democracy works in his or her local
community through experience, and “owning” this feeling manifests itself in either
positive or negative political action in wider political arenas.
Contemporary U.S. has witnessed a gradual shift of political responsibilities to the
local level; a shift fueled by political devolution, a process by which the federal
government transfers more responsibilities to local jurisdictions. An underlying
assumption is that decentralizing power to the local level creates a greater sense of
democracy and therefore a greater sense of influence and ownership among individuals.
In this respect, local responsibility increases partnerships and social relations that
function as channels of communication within and between various local stakeholder
groups. Local community residents have opportunities to participate in civil society,
develop a common understanding of social life, develop leadership skills and come
together to make more democratic and inclusive decisions. Civil society is therefore the
avenue to effective local governance and is critical for “making democracy work”
(Putnam 1993, 1995). In response to this shift in political focus, over the past two
decades there has been a reemergence of political and scholarly interest in participatory
democracy and civil society1.

1

Civil Society is defined as “the network of ties and groups through which people connect to one another
and get into community political affairs” (Skocpol and Fiorina, 1999:2). Civil society balances the power of
the state and shields individuals from the power of the state. It differs from the state, the economy and

3
Civil society represents a blend of social and political power through which civic
engagement and interacting individuals and groups authenticate its existence. It is
enhanced by positive social interactions and prevailing favorable characteristics of
localities.2 “The citizen is located as the member of a larger community precisely outside
the family and free of the state in the space of civil society - that same space is where
civic engagement can be bred” (Putzel 1997: 945). When citizens carry out tasks that
would otherwise be performed by the government, this keeps governmental power “in
check.” Moreover, an established civil society maintains and improves democracy by
opening communication channels for local political ideas and civic engagement. Civil
society provides opportunities for learning, skill building, creating new leaders, and
nurturing a culture of democracy that acts as a launching pad for average citizens and the
younger generation to participate in local and wider political landscapes. Accordingly, a
stable and effective civil society not only provides opportunities for individuals to be
heard, it provides a milieu for developing trust and other social resources and for
developing and organizing attitudes toward participatory democracy and political civic
engagement.
In view of such assertions, this dissertation addresses the questions: Are people
who are “civically engaged” and who exhibit “generalized and/or particularized trust”
more likely to experience greater satisfaction with the way democracy works within the
family and kinship relations. Putnam (1993) views civil society as citizen participation in formal
organizations, for him civil society is key for successful democracy.
2
In terms of participatory democracy, the issue is the question of the effect of the setting on social
behavior. Wilkinson’s study assumes setting to be important. With the conception of community as a
social field, the context (in its spatial and temporal dimensions) can never be separated from the processes
of social interaction that define it as a context. The context - and the action “affect” one another. The
question then is whether the civil society in one context differs systematically from the actions in other
contexts because of contextual effects (see Wilkinson, 1991).

4
current political environment of a community? What roles do social capital and civic
engagement play in aiding people’s satisfaction with participatory governance? What
forms of social capital and civic engagement are most useful in predicting satisfaction
with democracy? To what extent do various dimensions of social capital and civic
engagement account for differences in peoples’ levels of satisfaction with the way
democracy works?
To this end, this study examines the extent to which forms of social capital and
civic engagement predict individual satisfaction with the way participatory democracy
works. I consider social capital as an effective avenue to explain connections among
people (social networks). It illustrates how the depth of these relationships acts as
mechanisms that affect individuals’ ability to participate in consensus decision making
and potentially reinforce their satisfaction with local democratic processes. Examining
these issues is particularly relevant as establishing viable civil societies has become a key
issue in many states where more governance responsibilities have been placed at the local
level. Further as Kim (2000) points out a liberal democratic polity cannot be viably
sustained without citizens with civic virtues. Such characteristics Kim argues are
“cultivated, reproduced, and reinforced through an active, voluntary associational life in a
pluralistically organized civil society” (Kim 2000:198).
Acknowledging that social capital formation, civic engagement, and systems of
participatory decision making do not exist in a capricious vacuum (instead they occur in
a concrete social context within specific economic, social, and political milieu), I contend
that local communities provide an ideal setting for nurturing these three phenomena as
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participatory democracy resources and ultimately cultivating individual-level democracy
satisfaction.
The theoretical soundness of social capital, civic engagement, and civil society
perspectives for this dissertation lies in the fact that each encompasses notions of
participatory citizenship. However, I focus on social capital and civic engagement as the
substance of civil society. Civil society provides an avenue for civic engagement and
interaction, and social capital and civic engagement are augmented when people
participate and interact with one another in various roles to accomplish short-term and
long-term goals. Consequently, societies with an abundant stock of social capital should
be more likely to respond to concerns of citizens more readily and effectively work in
partnerships, groups, and institutions to achieve common goals. This is especially true
when a community is in a crisis mode.
At its highest level of functionality, participatory democracy denotes much more
than citizens’ capability to articulate their demands. It signifies a mechanism for exerting
influence, learning responsibility and civic virtues. It helps residents to purposefully
participate in and affect the outcome of various social and political activities. Such
participation ultimately affects peoples’ psyche/emotions and fosters a sense of
contentment and optimistic feelings about local democracy processes.
In essence, prolific participation and strong associational life are the engines
behind effective democracy. Putnam (1993a), a noted proponent of the importance of
social capital, civic engagement, and civic life in effective democratic processes, centers
his argument on how social networks foster trust and civic engagement. In highlighting
associational life and its utility for democracy, he states; “networks of civic engagement
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that cut across social cleavages nourish wider cooperation” (Putnam 1993a:175). Verba
and Nie (1987) also note that participation is important for democracy, not only because
it communicates citizens’ needs and desires to the government, but because it is a prime
source of satisfaction with one’s own role.
In addition, it can be argued that optimistic worldviews motivate public-spirited
citizens to cooperate and coordinate civic activities with confidence that things can be
better. An optimistic stance should increase efficacious attitudes and participatory
behaviors, which should in turn foster greater returns by creating a fertile breeding
ground for the enhancement of one’s satisfaction with the degree of “democratic
influence” available to an individual. As stated by Putnam (2000), a pervasive finding
from life satisfaction research globally is the idea that the breadth and depth of one’s
social connections best predict one’s sense of contentment (Putnam 2000).
Abundant levels of participatory efficacy should therefore augment one’s level of
satisfaction with democratic processes. In this vein, I argue that democracy satisfaction
should evoke the feeling that one is a part of mutually-beneficial collective actions. As a
result, the main objective in this dissertation is to examine the extent to which social
capital and civic engagement predict satisfaction with the way democracy works. In
doing this I define and measure components of individual level social capital and civic
engagement and use them as predictors of democracy satisfaction.
This study is a micro-level analysis and not macro-level. Consequently,
measuring and empirically testing community social capital and civic engagement are not
among the aims of this dissertation; neither will I measure the extent of actual
participatory democracy in communities. Community signifies a contextual background,
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a place where patterns and qualities of relationships are developed, where micro-level
interaction creates and sustain trust, and where participation that fosters the outcome of
satisfaction with the way democracy works resides.

1.2 Research Premise
Putnam (1993a) argues that effective governance and democracy is contingent on
social capital. Putnam (2000) and Brehm and Rahn (1997) found a notable relationship
between strong civic culture and civic engagement. It is argued that peoples’
involvement in local organizations should have an independent effect on democracy
satisfaction. Therefore, the general question of how satisfied people are with how
democracy works in local communities serves as a barometer for social equality and
participatory equity in a devolved socio-political system like that of the U.S. Studying
relationships between social capital, civic engagement, and democracy satisfaction is an
important research venture because it encompasses personal attitudes towards the current
political milieu and how much this is mediated by a broader social context. I contend
that within the current political milieu and contemporary revival of civil society,
scholarship should go beyond macro-level analyses of democracy and also include
predictors of individual level perceptions of participatory democracy.
The focus of this dissertation is participatory democracy. In this regard, I am
interested mainly in two research strands of social capital and civic engagement; (1)
empirically examining individuals who exhibit trust3 and are members of organizations;
and (2) contextualizing communities and civic organizations in which individuals interact
and participate.
3

For this dissertation, the focus is on outcomes of trust rather than trust formation.
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1.3 Objectives of the Study
The primary objective of this dissertation is to evaluate links among social capital,
civic engagement, and democracy satisfaction within the milieu of participatory
democracy (see Figure 1.1). Accordingly, specific objectives of this dissertation are:
(a) To examine “generalized trust” and “particularized trust” (components of
social capital) as predictors of democracy satisfaction. In achieving this goal, I
disaggregated these two elements of trust both conceptually and empirically. Thus I
constructed and empirically tested a parsimonious typology that captures two main ideas:
(i) that particularized trust and generalized trust are not mutually exclusive categories;
and (ii) that it is useful to distinguish diversity in the combination of, and the degree to
which people are particularized trusters and/or generalized trusters.
(b) The second objective is to examine the extent to which these dimensions of
social capital account for difference in individual levels of satisfaction with the way
democracy works.
(c) The third objective is to examine if civic engagement (local political civic
engagement such as working on community issues, attending community meetings,
contacting a public official or being a member of a local organization, as well as
representative political civic engagement such as voting) might increase one’s level of
satisfaction with the way democracy works4.
(d) Finally, assuming that giving to church and charities and volunteering time
improve opportunities to contribute to community welfare, I examine how these specific
altruistic elements of civic engagement influence democracy satisfaction.
4

Here, the assumption is organizational membership is local where citizens can actively participate in
activities.

9
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Figure 1.1: Social Capital, Civic Engagement and Democracy Satisfaction Model
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1.4 Significance of the Study
Researching the issue of how social capital and civic engagement can affect
people’s ability to influence decision making for individual and community benefits and
ultimately their satisfaction with the way democracy works is warranted for a number of
general reasons. First, decentralization of political decision making to local government
in the U.S. is advancing and the devolution of power is important for local level
development initiatives. Second, the importance of participatory democracy in the U.S.
is reinforced by George W. Bush’s emphasis on enabling and promoting faith-based and
community initiatives that address the nation’s social problems.
Third, the contemporary importance of democracy satisfaction stems from
increasing trends toward the global diffusion of democracy (see Wejnert 2005). Finally,
strengthening and spreading democracy is an explicit goal of the foreign policy of George
W. Bush’s administration and just about every other administration in the twentieth and
twenty first centuries. Recent efforts by the U.S. to democratize Afghanistan and Iraq
(marked by the current deployment of U.S. soldiers in those countries) as well as efforts
to help Palestine and Israel achieve peace and democratize are testaments to a continued
drive to spread democracy and pro-democratic attitudes. This is further illustrated by the
following recent quote from President George W. Bush’s, 2005 State of the Union
Address: “America’s actions will result in the spread of democracy in the broader Middle
East.”
More specific reasons for this research include the notion that participatory
democracy is in reality a socio-political system, which warrants sociological inquiry and
analysis because it comprises different levels and forms of social organizations consisting
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of intricate networks of human relationships. Studying links between participatory
democracy, social capital, and civic engagement is important because efficient
democracy is effectively shaped and established when groups are bond together by shared
interests and goals. Thus, this study can contribute to the knowledge and practice of
sociology. Sociology suggests that when citizens cooperate to solve socio-political
problems, positive outcomes occur in terms of (a) establishing trust, (b) social networks,
(c) social equality, and (d) effective governance. A potential offshoot of all these
processes is satisfaction with democracy, a sharper awareness of this offshoot should aid
in understanding the complex and multifaceted nature systems of democratic governance,
social interaction, and engagement.
This dissertation contributes to the literature by increasing our understanding of
how the individual value of social capital and civic engagement contributes to advancing
participatory democracy and satisfaction at a personal-social psychological level (as
against regional and state level studies). This understanding is imperative in that, if
participatory democracy is effective, it should evoke widespread feelings of satisfaction
with the way democracy works among citizens. Empirical work on democracy
satisfaction can signify elements of modern progress, overall social welfare, reflected in
individual level satisfaction with the way of life in the U.S. In addition, a sense of
contentment and positive attitudes toward participatory democracy among individuals
can engender efficacy and community support among citizens, creating a fertile ground
for local development. This research has potential application for wider social settings
and implications for wider social goals and broader political activities.

12
1.5 Definition of Terms
Putnam’s conceptualization of social capital embraces both an associational
(social networks) and a social trust aspect of social capital, but theoretically and
empirically (Purnam, 1993a and 2000). As examined in chapter III, social capital and
civic engagement have been given a number of different definitions in the social science
discipline. “On one hand, social connectedness and civic engagement of individuals such
as associational membership are seen as a crucial component of social capital because
they embody the capability to mobilize a wide range of personal contacts that are decisive
to the improvement and effective functioning of one’s social and political life. On the
other hand, defined as subjective norms of trust, social capital involves attitudes people
have about other people and therefore reveals how individuals are affiliated with each
other.” (Freitag 2003:937). I concur with Freitag (2003) who argues that even though
these two dimensions of social capital are closely interrelated there are reasons to
separate them conceptually. He suggests that norms and values like social trust are
subjective and intangible, thus embracing a more qualitative dimension. While social
networks are objective and observable, thus taking on a more quantitative element.
For this dissertation social capital is defined as:
Social resources that are ingrained in network connections, reciprocity norms, and
social trust that facilitate a variety of participatory transactions that allow individuals,
groups, and the community at large to cooperate and coordinate activities in achieving
mutual goals for mutual benefit.
Civic engagement is defined as:
Conscious individual and group actions aimed at making a difference in
community civic life. It entails deliberate and cooperative actions in identifying and
solving public concerns both within political and non-political realms.
And finally, democracy satisfaction is defined as:
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A sense of contentment, fulfillment and general optimism about one’s ability to
influence socio-political decision making processes within his/her community.
1.6 Organization of the Dissertation
This chapter provides a brief overview and preamble on the conceptual
framework of this study. The research premise, research significance, research objectives,
and how this research advances sociological literature are presented. I also describe the
logic of the research approach; especially the relevance of social capital and civic
engagement, and how these notions contribute to the objectives of my study. In chapter
II, the concept of democracy is explained, paying particular attention to the multidimensionality of this concept in general and specifically participatory democracy.
Notions of civil society and social resources are described in terms of their importance in
advancing participatory democracy, the efficiency of governmental institutions, and the
political performance of local communities. This chapter examines how participatory
processes, social capital, and civic engagement connect citizens to local governance and
impact their satisfaction with democracy. The chapter ends with an overview of a
participatory democracy perspective and an elaboration of my reasons for focusing on
participatory democracy and why “democracy satisfaction” is a viable response variable.
Chapter III reviews literature related to social capital and civic engagement
perspectives in light of their explanatory power regarding participation and democracy
satisfaction. This provides the theoretical framework for this study. In this regard, a
brief historical overview of social capital theory and civic engagement is presented; also
there is an overview of different conceptual definitions associated with these
perspectives, and a review of the contributions of Putnam. This chapter validates the
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explanatory scope of the theory and outlines various dimensions and measurements of
social capital, as well as their implications for effective participatory democracy. Chapter
III ends with a review of the findings of pertinent research that underpin both theoretical
and empirical understandings of the link between participation, social capital, civic
engagement, and participatory democracy.
Chapter IV reviews social demographic factors that may enhance or constrain
one’s ability to develop social capital and to be civically engaged. Thus the chapter
reviews literature that examines issues of race; gender; age; human capital; home
ownership; marital status, and political orientation as they relate to social capital
formation, civic engagement, and ultimately satisfaction with participatory democracy.
The fifth chapter presents the research methodology. It describes data and
measures, as well as statistical procedures employed in the study. Specifically, factor
analysis and logistic regression are discussed in the context of this research. Chapter VI
presents the empirical results.
The final chapter discusses empirical results and their implications. This chapter
presents concluding statements, empirical contributions of the study, study limitations,
policy implications, and possible areas for future research.

CHAPTER II
PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AS CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

2.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the concept of democracy and explores its
multidimensionality. It is not only important to understand the notion of democracy in
general, but exploring the various dimensions of democracy draws attention to its
connection to social capital and civic engagement and participatory processes. This
discussion sets the stage for my literature review in Chapter III where I elaborate on the
part of my conceptual model that highlights democracy satisfaction, civic engagement
and social capital theory. In this vein, I focus on specific aspects of participatory
democracy and highlight its relevance as a basis for realizing the objectives of this study.
A discussion of the centrality of social capital and civic engagement to democracy
satisfaction follows. In subsequent sections I present conceptual links between social
capital, civic engagement, and participatory democracy which provide a contextual
background for this study.

2.2 Democracy
In general, the concept of democracy describes a set of ideals such as dignity,
liberty, and equality (Kellner 1975; Tocqueville 1840). In democratic societies,
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governance is conducted in such a way that decisions are made by the people themselves
or by their elected representatives. Democracy entails governance by consent of the
individual, which is consistent with true and honest respect for the dignity and integrity
of the individual (Kellner 1975).
Dahl (1998) argues that in principle, democracy provides opportunities for
effective participation, equality in voting, gaining enlightened understanding, exercising
final control over the agenda, and inclusion of adults. He agrues that these attributes are
critical to the democratic process, if citizens are to be politically equal in determining
policies of associations. When any of these criteria are violated, its members will not be
politically equal and democracy is weakened. Putzel (1997) argues that “…. democracy
rests in large part on a notion of individuals as citizens endowed with inalienable rights,
despite their location in family, ethnic group, or class” ( p 945).
It is reasonable to assert that the quality of democracy can be assessed by the
satisfaction expressed by its citizens. Sait (1940) argues that a democratic way of life
requires a full measure of cooperation between different and yet interdependent
individuals, and provides opportunities for self-realization. Thus, no effort should be
spared to promote mutual understanding and widen areas of common interests.

2.2.1 Democracy – A Multi-Dimensional Concept
Democratic governance is traditionally quite complex, yet democracy is
conventionally treated as a single dimension concept. Linking multifaceted notions of
social capital, civic engagement, and democracy satisfaction, requires an understanding
for the multi-dimensionality of democracy as a concept. Democracy is a
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multidimensional phenomenon (Inglehart 1999) and a value-laden term. Democracy is
also an “essentially contested” concept (Berg 1978). As a concept it inherently contains
elements of ambiguity, Canache et al., (2001) allude to “acceptable ambiguity" in
reference to understanding the concept of democracy. They argue that ambiguity is
inherent because democracy involves participation of ordinary citizens in decision
making at a community/micro-level over and beyond structural elements of legislative
make-up and casting their votes at national elections.

2.2.2 The Multidimensionality of Democracy and the Individual
Over six decades ago, Sanderson (1943) argued that the concept democracy is
much broader than political freedom, universal suffrage, and parliamentary government.
That is, democracy is not a matter of extant social structure. Instead it should be
conceived as a process toward an ideal relationship that evolves in the future as in the
past, that rests primarily on an attitude of individuals toward others, and a basic faith in a
desirable system of human relationships (Sanderson 1943). If democracy is essentially
faith in a better way of life whose realization depends on the behavior of each individual
(Sanderson 1943), I posit that people who express satisfaction with the way democracy
works are in effect expressing approval to the realization of a better way of life and
general welfare and not only an expression of regime support.
Democracy is largely an expression of a feeling that every person, whatever his or
her birth or occupation, shall develop the ability and have the opportunity to take part in
democratic processes. Its motive is individualism on one hand and voluntary public
service on the other (Sanderson 1943). John Dewey once wrote “Democracy must begin
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at home, and its home is the neighborly community” (quoted in Putnam, 2000:337).
Likewise, Morlino (2004) argues that one element of a good democracy is that citizens,
associations, and communities enjoy at least moderate liberty and equality.

2.2.3 Democracy Satisfaction
Several scholars have indicated that democracy satisfaction is multifaceted,
ambiguous, and value laden (Norris 1999) and therefore subject to multiple
interpretations (Canache, Mondak, & Seligson 2001; Karp & Shaun 2003). Canache et al.,
(2001) appositely allude to the notion that the unit of analysis of most “satisfaction with
democracy” studies is the individual, which suggests that satisfaction with democracy is a
summary indicator of individual-level satisfaction. They argue that when answering this
question, the respondent is influenced by a mix of considerations, that is; thoughts
concerning the community, (local-level participatory elements) the nation’s political
system and incumbent leaders (including local-level leaders). In this context, I argue that
democracy satisfaction includes an individual’s feeling of optimism and feeling of having
the power to produce a desired effect in and around his or her local community.
Democracy satisfaction should evoke the feeling that I am a part of mutually beneficial
collective actions of problem solving in my community.
“Satisfaction with democracy” is one of the most widely used indictors of
individual attitudes toward the political system (Karp and Shaun 2003; Karp & Bowler,
2001). In general, it is intended to measure support for the political system and is
assumed to be an indicator of the diffuse support necessary for institutions to build
legitimacy. Questions tapping into the issue of satisfaction with democracy have been
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widely administered in a number of countries and regularly appear on Eurobarometer
(EB) surveys. In the U.S., the following question was added to the American National
Election Studies on 11/10/2000, “On the whole, are you satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very
satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the United States?”
(ANES 2002). Responses to this question provided an appropriate dependent variable for
this dissertation and the validity of this variable has been firmly established in research
literature.
In their attempt to establish the construct validity of the satisfaction with
democracy survey question as an indicator of system support, Anderson and Guillory
(1997) reviewed past work on the issue. They found ample evidence to support that
“satisfaction with democracy” is an indicator of actual system support and not
coterminous with support for the serving government. They conclude that the validity of
satisfaction with democracy as an indicator “constitute a successful validation of the
indicator as a measuring instrument for a generalized attitude towards the political system
on the legitimacy dimension” (Anderson and Guillory 1997:7).
In general, literature affirms the multidimensionality of the concept of democracy
satisfaction, it involves more than approval of voting procedure, opinions about national
institutions, incumbent political representative approval, or performance endorsement of
a regime. Implicit in the notion of democracy, is an idea that citizens’ feelings about
democratic processes inheres at the local community level where collective acts of
democracy are carried out. Also, implicit is an idea that individual community members
who are affected by a decision should have the chance to participate in making that
decision.
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2.3 Participatory Democracy
This research is based on the premise that people’s perceptions and opinions of
their satisfaction with democracy, includes their perceived ability to impact local decision
making. An individual’s experience of democracy satisfaction is analytically related to
the type of democracy, thus it is important to distinguish between participatory
democracy and representative democracy. The primary difference between participatory
democracy and representative democracy is that participatory democracy embraces selfexploration and self development of the citizenry and representative democracy facilitates
expressions of perceived interests, but does not necessarily help citizens uncover their
real interests (Bachrach and Botwinick 1992). Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens
(1997) note that representative democracy combines four main features: regular free and
fair elections; universal suffrage; accountability of the state’s administrative organs to the
elected representatives; and effective guarantees for freedom of expression and
association as well as protection against arbitrary state action.
Dahl (1998) suggests that in addition to voting equality, enlightened
understanding and effective participation are necessary criteria for effective democratic
processes. Bachrach and Botwinick (1992) argue that the strength of participatory
democracy is that as people participate in the political process they become increasingly
informed, which in turn, helps them achieve new levels of involvement and awareness.
They argue that participation does not only result from political consciousness, it also
facilitates its creation. They further note that even when all four requirements noted by
Huber et. al (1997) are met, a country may be far from equal in collective decision
making. Further, representative democracy does not entail an equal distribution of actual
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political power. Therefore, they endorse participatory democracy characterized by high
levels of local level participation with systematic differences across social categories
such as race, ethnicity, and gender.
Substantiated by the forgoing assertions, I use democracy satisfaction as an
indicator of individual satisfaction with local level democracy. I further argue that if
individuals achieve democracy satisfaction, it is partly from their involvement in the
process of participatory democracy at the community level, hence my focus on
participatory democracy as against representative democracy.
An academic appeal of participatory democracy is ingrained in a need to prevent
the creation of a deep-rooted class of self-serving elites. To prevent this, democracy
would need to form an array of egalitarian institutions to ensure, to the extent justifiable,
equal start for all, equal opportunity for all, and a high degree of social mobility (Ll,
l999). Ll (1999) argues that a potential problem of representative democracy is the
detachment and alienation felt by many "small" people because there seems to be no way
for them to influence public policy. Thus representative democracy needs liberal
institutions such as autonomous associations, civil society, and ample room for political
mobilization and individual participation. Autonomous associations are not only
legitimate but are necessary to democracy on a large scale (Ll 1999).
Moreover, the relevance of participatory democracy as an avenue to experience
democracy satisfaction lies in the fact that it engages citizens in “making decisions,”
rather than in “making demands” (Radcliff and Wingenbach 2000). The former implies intensive
face-to-face participation in small settings allowing deliberation and reasoned argument.
The latter involves the mere expression of political preferences such as the anonymous
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act of voting. “Making demands’ does not psychologically engage the individual in the
manner proposed by advocates of participatory democracy and hence is unlikely to
provide the same benefits as “making decisions” (Radcliff and Wingenbach 2000:981).
“Making decisions” is relevant to democracy satisfaction because it reveals the
“true” interest of the community whereas “making demands” may not. Radcliff and
Wingenbach (2000), argue that given the same set of self-interested preferences, the style
of participation in each situation leads to different consequences for participants.
Institutions of community life support local level participatory democracy (as against
representational democracy) because they bestow opportunities for civic engagement and
legitimacy to local organizations as well as engage people in policy processes.
Participatory democracy implies that citizens expect frequent consultation
regarding issues that affect their lives. It is important because it curtails a vertical relation
between citizenry and the state and reduces passivity among citizens. Verba, Lehman,
Schlozman, and Brady (1995) found a positive relationship between individuals’ civic
association and their political participation. Participation is based on a democratic ideal
of citizen representation in local decision-making. Oliver (2000) argues that large size
discourages participation, partly because people are less likely to be mobilized and are
less interested in local political life. When citizens become involved in working out a
mutually acceptable solution for a project (civic engagement) that affects their
community, they increase interpersonal ties and trust (social capital) and grow into
democratically responsible citizens and reaffirm democracy (Shepherd and Bowler 1997).
I focus on participatory democracy in this dissertation because it is considered to
have a positive intervening impact on people’s satisfaction with democracy. I assert that
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participatory democracy embraces a personal and social-psychological substance of
democracy, beyond the national political realm, to strengthen social-cultural dimensions
of democracy. In general, the literature shows that the social context of participatory
democracy implies interaction in small polity size rather than in large areas of population,
where individuals have opportunities for self-exploration, self-expression, consultation
and participation in decision making. This assertion ties in with ideas that individuals
may be satisfied with participatory democracy because they are able to influence local
decision making through civic engagement1, but they may be quite dissatisfied with statelevel and national-level democracy (representative democracy).
In addition, satisfaction with democracy as conceived in this dissertation does not
necessarily reflect democracy at national and state levels (particularly as an indicator of
general attitudes toward the political system). More specifically, individual feeling of
democracy satisfaction is exemplified in participation in various communities and faith
based organizations, neighborhood associations and voluntary associations - participatory
organizations, rather than representative institutions. Participation is a process that puts
participatory democracy into effect and in the context of this research; it is instrumental
but not an end in itself. Such participation is a means to spread the burden of
responsibility to a wider sphere of people and to stimulate democracy satisfaction.
Given this premise, and concurring with proponents of participatory democracy,
civil society, civic engagement, and social capital, I conceptualize satisfaction with
democracy in terms of individuals’ perception of their ability to influence decision-

1

Civic engagement implies individual and collective actions designed to identify and address issues of
public concern. Scholars have used the terms civic engagement, political participation and civic
participation interchangeable. In this dissertation I tend toward civic engagement, but I recognize these
other concepts as describing fundamentally the same phenomena.
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making at the community level. Nevertheless, I recognize that a representative system of
democracy is still vital. Urbinati’s (2000) asserts that in the character of democratic
politics (even in a devolved political environment like the U.S.), participation and
representation are not alternative forms of democracy; instead they are related forms
constituting a continuum of political action in modern democracies. 2

2.4 Social Capital and Civic Engagement: Implications for Participatory Democracy
Social capital and civic engagement are theoretical companions of participatory
democracy perspective because they are imbued with elements of participation for the
mutual benefit of individuals and community. A core idea of social capital as it relates to
democracy satisfaction is that it is a resource for shared action. Civil society and
participatory democracy are maintained by collective action, and social capital and civic
engagement are beneficial in advancing issues associated with collective activities such
as participatory democracy.
It has been established that social capital aids in the creation democratic societies.
Examining former communist societies with weak civic traditions, Putnam (1993) argues
that without norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement, “amoral familism,
clientelism, lawlessness, ineffective government, and economic stagnation” seem
“likelier than successful democratization and economic development” (p183). Not only
does social capital help create democracy in a country that is not democratic, it can help
to maintain or improve existing democracies like the U.S. (Paxton 2002). In the former
case, Paxton argues it works through well-established associations that counter a state’s
2

Urbinati (2000) presents a cogent argument for the relevance of representation
in the article entitled “Representation as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic Deliberation.”
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ability to directly oppress citizens and provides an arena for developing organized
opposition to non- democratic regimes. In the latter case such associations “teach
tolerance, promote compromise, and stimulate political participation and train leaders –
all of which contribute to a healthy democracy” (Paxton 2002:257).
Putnam’s (1993) research in Italy relates to performances of regional governments
but his study of social capital and civic engagement can be interpreted with reference to
community relations that affect individual interactions. Perhaps one of the most important
benefits that social capital bestows on participatory democracy is its capacity for
mobilizing and dispensing opportunities for social network connections and civic
engagement within communities.

2.5 Civic Engagement and Participatory Democracy
Democracy is often considered to be superior to all other forms of government
(Kellner 1975), because it implies that ordinary people share in some form of influence in
the collective power that constitutes the state in which they live (Patterson 1999).
Theories highlighting the importance of civic participation in non-political-organizations
and social ties of community as the image of American democracy have their tradition in
Tocqueville’s ideas presented in his 1835 book Democracy in America. Impressed by the
diversity of associations, Tocqueville noted that American democracy was driven by
town meetings, associations, and other visible forms of civic engagement, to which he
attributed its success. He viewed participation in these non-political associations as vital
in countering tendencies toward individualism. Also, he suggested that civic participation
was fueled by the belief that in general people are cooperative, trustworthy and helpful.
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Putnam’s (1993) empirical study found that dense networks of civic engagement fostered
by civil associations generated greater effectiveness in regional governments in Northern
Italy. In this dissertation, I extend Putnam’s (1993, 1995, 2000) as well as Tocqueville’s
emphasis on the importance of strong and active associational life in advancing civic
actions among citizens as well as fostering attitudes and inclinations toward participatory
democracy.
Without social networks that helps establishment of civic organizations and
participation in local decision making, democracy is impeded. By extension,
communities and their institutions share a history through which people develop common
purposes, interests, and traditions that ultimately bind them together and help them
decipher pertinent local issues and participate in larger political issues. Interaction in
daily living leads to common interests, mutual identity, and commitment in the local
territory (Wilkinson 1991). Therefore, a foundation for people’s development as
members of society and enjoying their democratic status in a concrete way lies in local
civic engagement.
I argue that democracy satisfaction is cognitive; it resides in one’s psyche, it is
attitudinal rather than behavioral - involving some measure of contentment about being
able to influence democracy and enhance one’s civic spirit. But this emotionally and
psychologically inclination toward democracy is difficult to achieve without interaction
within civic organizations. When social connectedness exists, people can more easily
communicate their preferences and become involved in decision making, leading to
greater opportunities for local participation and greater opportunities for experiencing a
sense of democracy satisfaction. I posit that satisfaction with democracy reflects political
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attitudes and feelings and is largely a qualitative/psychological/ internalized
phenomenon. Note, however, that it is invariably fuelled by collective efficacy, civic
engagement and influence and it is difficult to achieve by “bowling alone”- to use
Putnam’s (2000) popular metaphor.
Accordingly, the importance of civic engagement in fuelling individual
democracy satisfaction has taken on new meaning because it is in civic institutions that
individuals can develop the will to act collectively and enter into democratic processes
(Warren 2001). Indeed, social capital and civic engagement makes American democracy
work (Couto and Guthrie 1999; Putnam 1993a). Social norms and role expectations in
civic organizations affect peoples’ perceptions of civil society and democratic
participation. The thrust toward greater local participation can be understood within the
context of the desire to establish new mechanisms of inclusion and involvement as a
means of social cohesion (Chandler 2001). Warren (2001) further describes the
importance of civil society in the U.S. and the importance of creating organizations that
enhance grassroots political and democratic power. He recognizes the need to develop
civic associations that cut across lines of class, gender and race. He aptly points out that
faith based organizations have a central role to play in grassroots political involvement,
as well as in efforts to revitalize democracy in America (Warren 2001).
Over three decades ago Dahl (1967) argued that most democracies are too big to
foster citizens’ ability to actively determine aspect of their lives as a collectivity. He
reasoned that in order to facilitate civic participation and have an entity large enough to
generate meaningful political discourse large cities should be divided into municipalities
of between 50,000 and 200,000 in size. “America has changed from a country bifurcated
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between isolated rural towns and big central cities to one that consists largely of small
and medium-sized suburbs” (Oliver 2000:361). Civic engagement takes place in smaller
delimited physical territories – at a smaller spatial scale. For example, Oliver (2000)
found a negative relationship between civic engagement and city size. City boundaries
define communities and smaller places are civically richer (Oliver 2000).
Although Putnam (2000) implies that small town communities in the U.S. are rife
with trusting people, I maintain that the idea of small size from this point of view can
potentially counter one of the main arguments presented in this dissertation. This is
because small town communities can be populated with particularized trusters and not
generalized trusters.3 I argue generalized trust is beneficial for civic-mindedness and
civil society and ultimately some satisfaction with the way democracy works as we will
see later in Chapter III.

2.6 Social Networks and Participatory Democracy
The quintessence of social capital is it is a resource that gives optimum utility
when it is shared, shared through social networks consisting of individuals and
organizations. In effect, all individuals or social groups have some form of social capital
to invest or activate in a variety of social, economic, and political settings. Brehm and
Rahn (1997) argue that from an individual standpoint, social capital manifests itself as a
tight reciprocal relationship between levels of civic engagement and interpersonal trust.
Therefore it is argued that, “A well connected individual in a poorly connected society is

3

Generalized trust is trust that can be generalized to people who are strangers. Particularize trust refers to
people who have faith in their own kind; who are skeptical of strangers and consider them as
untrustworthy. Uslaner refers to generalized trust and moralistic trust in his 1993b and 2002 work. For this
dissertation I use generalized trust throughout.

29
not as productive as a well connected individual in a well connected society. And even
poorly connected individuals may derive some of the spillover benefits from living in a
well-connected community” (Putnam 2000:20).
As pointed out by Lin (2000), however, “not all individuals or social groups
uniformly acquire social capital or receive expected returns from their social capital” (p
786). Thus, social capital is not homogenous in all communities.4 Moreover, certain
structural characteristics of networks such as size, density, extent of closure, and diversity
of the backgrounds, along with relational aspects such as inequality, shape the social
capital capacity of a network (Winter 2000). These structural characteristics of social
capital influence the nature of one’s social capital. Similarly, Verba and Nie (1987)
contend that participation remains a powerful social force for increasing or decreasing
inequality depending on who takes advantage of it.
Bonds of social capital affect the quality of participation (Paxton 2002). In
recognizing links between social capital, civic engagement, and participatory democracy
and, by extension, establishing the importance of such links to individual feelings of
democracy satisfaction, I concur with Forrest and Kearns (2001). They underscore eight
basic tenets of social capital and civic engagement that are pertinent for participatory
democracy (see Figure 1.2). In Figure 1.2, I adjusted this presentation by incorporating
implications for participatory democracy based on my review of the literature.

4

See Lin 2000 for an analysis of why groups encounter differences in social capital deficits and/or
return deficits.
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Component of Social
Capital/Civic Engagement

Meaning

Implications for
Participatory Democracy

This fosters civic society, as
Putnam posits that civil
society contributes to
successful governance and
democracy.
Participation creates a pool
2. Participation
of social capital that
upholds civic engagement
and participatory
democracy. Pooled actions
can make a difference, as
citizens work to set goals to
meet the needs and desires
of the community.
3. Associational activity and When people cooperate this Leads to people becoming
civically engaged results in the formation of
common purposes
formal and informal groups contacting public officials
to voice their demands on
to further collective
government on behalf of the
interests.
community (community
level civil society activism)
– which is associated with
higher levels of democracy.
With regard to Putnam’s
4. Supporting networks and Individuals and
idea of “civic virtue." Civic
organizations cooperate to
reciprocity
support mutual or one-sided virtue is most potent when
rooted in supporting
gain; an expectation that
networks of reciprocal
help is available if needed.
social relations. A society
of many virtuous and
connected individuals is
primary for effective
participatory democracy.
Figure 2.1: Domains of Social Capital, Civic Engagement and their Implications for
Participatory Democracy.
1. Empowerment

When people feel they have
a voice, are involved in
processes that affect them
and can take action to
initiate changes.
Citizens take part in social
and community activities so
that local events are well
attended.
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Figure 2.1 continued
5. Collective norms and
values; trust

That people share common
values and norms of
behavior.

This promotes community
interests and increase
people’s propensity and
willingness to organize into
democratic groups and set
and achieve common goals
for the community. It
facilitates efficiency in civic
engagement through
coordinated actions.

6. Trust

That people feel they can
trust their co-residents and
local organizations
responsible for governing or
serving their area.

Trust is a precondition for
participatory democracy.
Generalized trust in
particular, with its outward
focus fosters bridging to
diverse groups and
communities that fuels the
emergence of participatory
democracy.

7. Safety

That people feel that they
can trust resulting in no
restrictions of public space
due to fear.

In general a sense of safety
lubricates social life and
frees people to participate in
local political affairs.

8. Belonging

That people feel connected
to each other and their
home area and have a sense
of belonging to the place
and its people.

Community attachment
sustains local civic
engagement.

Source: Adapted from Forrest and Kearns 2001.
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Wright (1976) concurs with participation outside the political sphere in the sense
that it creates a community where citizens show more respect for each other. He arrives at
this conclusion despite having previously argued that community could be conceived of
as a place where interests of citizens are respected even though some are not able to
actually participate in making policies.
Countering Pateman’s (1970) argument that “mere presence” is not sufficient
evidence for participation, Wright maintains that even sub-participatory acts, such as
being present at meetings, involves exerting influence. If participation requires action,
Wright argues that certain body language communication such as “raising an eyebrow or
folding one’s arm across one’s chest, or the “negative action” of being conspicuously
unmoved by entreaty, which feeds back to the speaker” (1976:229-230), may in fact
cause people to feel they are influencing the democratic process.

2.7 Participatory Democracy: Social Context
Invariably, local input in political decisions through participatory democracy
occurs at a local or community level. Thus in the current political milieu, community has
re-surfaced as a meaningful unit of social organization. It is a setting where individuals
participate in society and a place for production and maintenance of social capital.
Community is a place where social capital is translated into people power and is a place
of local power and civic virtue that facilitates greater citizen participation and possibly a
higher individual-level satisfaction with democracy. Thus, active citizen participation,
dynamic associational life, horizontal relations of reciprocity and cooperation, and mutual
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trust are major forms of civic community resources.5 Participatory democracy and civic
engagement facilitate coordination and cooperation at the community level, which
promotes growth of associational relationships in local areas.
Devolution of decision making provides citizens a legitimacy to participate in
local organizations, build local social resources, enhance self-determination, and build
civic community agency. Social capital enhances the state of civic engagement and social
trust in liberal democracies. In this sense, social capital comprises stocks of active
associations among people inclusive of trust, shared values, mutual understanding, and
actions that connect members of social networks and communities that make cooperative
action possible (Cohen and Prusak 2001). Thus, in exploring the question; can the public
policy of devolution advance participatory democracy and ultimately impact levels of
satisfaction with the way democracy works? social networks and civic engagement are
key variables.
It has been established that successful and healthy democracies and economies are
those possessing dense webs of community participation (see Walters 2002).
Communities with civic activism and moral behavior, where individuals give others their
due, are more prosperous (Putnam 1993b; Uslaner 1999a).
Coleman (1988b) emphasizes the importance of communities in terms of benefits
they yield to individuals. Over many years of living and sharing in physical proximity to
each other and sharing norms of trust and reciprocity within social networks, a feeling of
cooperation and connectedness develops among individual, groups, and the wider
community. As a result, and beyond aiding civic engagement, positive outcomes of social
capital are manifested in communities with high levels of social capital as community
5

According to Putnam 1993a, civic communities value civic participation, solidarity, and integrity.
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members feel a sense of safety as neighbors informally keep watch on each other
properties and children can be sent to play outside because tight community control
ensures the welfare of neighborhood children (Coleman 1988b).
In communities with low levels of social capital, there is less trust among
neighbors, parents do not feel a sense of safety and may keep their kids under close watch
at home or deliberately provide adult company for them as they play in the neighborhood.
Abundant levels of social trust serve to reduce transaction costs in local communities and
markets. Indeed, the most common function attributed to social capital is that it is a
source of network-mediated benefits beyond the immediate family (Portes 1988).
A pervasive theme emerging in research literature is a view that concepts of
community and democracy are connected in theories of civil society, participation, civic
engagement, and social capital (Paxton 1998). Coleman (1988a) argues that the value of
social resources depends on social organization. Social capital combines organizational
resources with other resources to produce different system-level behaviors and different
outcomes for individuals (Coleman 1988a). “The function identified by the concept of
“social capital” is the value of these aspects of social structure to actors as resources that
they can use to achieve their interests” (Coleman 1988a: S101).
People are increasingly able to participate in civic engagement that affects their
personal life thus increasing potential for improving their satisfaction democracy. This
scenario is congruent with Putnam’s assertion that, as property of communities and
nations, social capital is simultaneously a cause and effect. Similarly, Schuller (2001)
argues that social capital is generally understood as a matter of relationships, as a
property of groups rather than the property of individuals (Schuller 2001). Consequently,
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community is viewed as a place where social capital resides through social networks. As
Brehm and Rahn emphasize:
Social capital is an aggregate concept that has its basis in individual
behavior, attitudes, and predispositions. Multiple institutions nurture
the habits and values that give rise to social capital, including
community and other voluntary associations, families, church
organizations, and cultural patterns (Brehm and Rahn 1997:1000).
This dissertation assumes that communities with well developed social capital
foster participatory democracy and civic virtues that positively impact democracy
satisfaction. In other words, collective social capital is more applicable for participatory
democracy than social capital as an individual resource. Community represents a
decision-making system as a whole where the individual is merely a part of that system.
Although some scholars (e.g., Portes 1998) contest Putnam’s (1995a) argument
that social capital is community property, the idea is applicable in explaining impacts of
networks of associations on democracy satisfaction. A community that has a welldeveloped social infrastructure tends to engage in collective action for community
betterment (Flora 1998). Coleman argues that unlike other forms of capital, “social
capital inheres in the structure of relations between actors and among actors” and dense
social networks are necessary for the emergence of social capital (Coleman 1988a:S98).
He emphasizes the importance of norms of reciprocity in the collectivity when he states,
“a prescriptive norm within a collectivity that is an especially important form of social
capital is the norm that one should forego self interest and act in the interest of the
collectively” (Coleman 1988a: S104).
Expectations and obligations within social structures exert influence on individual
action. Therefore, in terms of communities and the wider society, social structure
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influences actions of individual actors based on obligations and expectations, and these
same obligations and expectations in turn influence the nature of social structure.
Coleman observes that social capital is inherent in the structure of family relationships
but he also states, “Social capital resides in the functional community, the actual social
relationships that exist among parents, in the closure exhibited by the structure of
relations, and in the parent's relations with the institutions of the community"
(1988b:387). For example, Coleman found that community social capital is a factor that
enhances educational attainment, which ultimately decreases social inequality.

2.8 Participatory Democracy: The Importance of Civil Society
This section supports a view that civil society promotes civic engagement, social
capital formation, and participatory democracy. In general, civil society enhances
democracy by mediating between citizens and the state (see Putnam 1993a). Bryant
(1993) asserts that a sociological variant of civil society refers to a non-market space or
arena between the individual/household and the overarching state affording possibilities
of concerted action and social self-organization. Bryant maintains that civil society
comprises social relations and communications between citizens; they may or may not be
informed by law and state policy, but are not necessarily dependent on them.6
The idea is not an unadulterated opposition between state and civil society.
Instead, “…there is a dialectical interaction between state and civil society. The state is
6

Neocleous (1995) argues that civil society is usually seen as the source of radical democratic processes. In
his interpretation of Hegel and Marx’s conceptualization of civil society, he argues that we cannot talk of
civil society without the state. He notes that civil society is actually shaped and ordered by the state. He
points out that Hegel sees state and civil society as structurally integrated with each other in a series of
interlocking mechanisms. Thus although civil society and state are separated conceptually, in reality there
is some level of penetration of civil society into state. For example, he points to the fact that problems
generated by the capitalist system of needs within civil society require administrative regulation by the
state.
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transformed by changing civil society; civil society is transformed by a changing state.
Thus, state and civil society form a fabric of tightly interwoven threads, even if they have
independent patterns” (Fatton 1995:67).
The strength of civil society is maintained by high levels of mutual trust among
individuals and organizations, norms of reciprocity, a shared a sense of identity, and
willingness to participate in voluntary work. Organizations encourage civic involvement
by developing citizens’ skills that enable them to engage in political participation (see
Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie 1993).
Networks of civic associations facilitate the stability and effectiveness of
participatory democracy. 7 “Civil society, understood as the realm of private voluntary
association, from neighborhood committees to interest groups to philanthropic enterprises
of all sorts, has come to be seen as an essential ingredient in both democratization and the
health of established democracies” (Foley and Edwards 1996:38). Verba and Nie (1987)
argue that voluntary associations not only increase the likelihood that people will
participate but represent a social institution that is central to studies of democratic
participation. They assume voluntary associations allow more opportunities for
participation in small units than do larger political organizations.
7

An association is defined as a formally organized named group, most of whose members are not
financially compensated for participation (Knoke 1986). It is these kinds of associations that are relevant
for this research to a large extent, and not those that are primary groups such as family, private sector or
bureaucratic organizations. In this context, organization refers to a broad set functionally specialized
societal subsystems: such as church related groups, social movement organizations or their local chapters ,
political parties, professional societies, business and trade organizations, fraternal and sororal
organizations, recreational clubs, civic service associations, charity, social welfare councils, communes,
cooperatives, and neighborhood organizations.
These groups usually have face-to-face contact at local meetings (Popielarz 1999). Most associations
argues Knoke (1986) embrace principles of egalitarian and voluntary participation, perform essential
integrative tasks for a society, and account collectively for significant amounts of economic and political
activity in advanced industrial nations. In the cases where associations attempt to influence governmental
decisions, they are acting as interest groups (Knoke, 1986).
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In this regard, reorientations of American civic life since the 1960s have been
spurred by social movements and advocacy groups (Skocpol 2003). “Americans are
reinventing community too – joining flexible small groups and engaging in ad hoc
volunteering while supporting expert advocates who speak for important values on the
national stage” (Skocpol 2003:221). Engagement in civil society and participatory
democracy more often than not take place at the local, community, or city level. As
mentioned earlier, community, as used in this study, implies a structural role in enhancing
democracy at the local place; a structural element through which much of micro-level
social interactions occur. Inherently, increased community connectedness is key in
effective policy development and implementation, particularly in a devolved sociopolitical system like the U.S. Civil society is important for participatory democracy
because a major attribute of civil society is citizens’ inclination to act in the interest of the
community and beyond their self interest.

2.8.1 Civil Society, Social Networks, and Participatory Democracy
Civil society provides a path for addressing economic prosperity and
development, social well-being, moral issues, and environmental regulations, and other
concerns of citizens in their communities. Civil action usually occurs in non-privatized
collective realms; it is voluntary rather than compulsory, and persuasive rather than
coercive. Nonetheless, we should be mindful that civil associations are not necessarily
always separate from, or replacements for official politics. In reality they may even serve
as avenues for influencing public opinion and driving public policy (Galston 2000).
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The notion of civic culture was first proposed by Almond and Verba in 1963. The
hypothesis is that the viability of democratic institutions is strongly affected by attitudes
such as “belief in one’s ability to influence political decisions, feelings of positive affect
for the political system, and the belief that other citizens are basically trustworthy”
(Muller and Seligson 1994:635). As political decentralization in the U.S. expands, greater
emphasis is placed on civic culture and how participation in local organizations,
associations, and voluntary activities can enhance democracy. The rebirth of “civil
society” that encourages democratic social networks is contingent upon local
participation.
The renewal of civic society signifies a revival of democracy at the community
level that can challenge the state and federal levels of governance. In essence, civil
society’s virtue lies in its ability to constrain government behavior by stimulating citizen
activism, exerting pressure on the state, and inculcating pluralistic democratic values
(Booth and Bayer Richard 1998). This reduces the dominance of decisions by public
bureaucrats who have high levels of technical proficiency, but who are not directly held
responsible to citizens of affected localities (DeSario and Langton 1987). “Perhaps the
most valuable benefit participation could confer on the participants would be for
participation to serve as a means toward realizing the goal (and means) described as
community” (Wright 1976: 234). Civil society breeds social networks, which establishes
the basis of mutual trust and cooperation (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). This is
critical for effective participation. Although this is not the focus of this study, it should be
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noted that several authors have pointed to the “dark side” of civil society and political
organization8

2.10 Chapter Summary
This chapter reviews the concepts of democracy. It explores the
multidimensionality of the concept. Particular attention is devoted to participatory
democracy because unlike representative democracy, participatory processes are fueled
by trust, social networks and civic engagement. The chapter also contextualized these
processes within civil society by showing a link between participatory democracy and
civil society and how social capital ties these two phenomena together. The discussion
suggests that cooperative social networks, trust, and active civic engagement are
important social capital resources that facilitate participatory democracy, efficiency of
governmental institutions, and economic performance of contemporary societies. This
chapter highlights the value of social capital, civic engagement, and civil society in
advancing democratic processes. Effective participatory democratic processes it is

8

Not all contemporary scholars embrace the optimistic views associated with strong local social
life, civic engagement and successful participatory democracy. Skocpol (2003) diverges from Putnam by
highlighting connections between associational forms of social capital and inequality, group
marginalization and the potential ills of decision-making by elitist networks. Chambers and Kopstein
(1996) do not agree with perspectives on participation that suggest that participation is a panacea. They
examine civic participation that weakens liberal democracy which they call “bad civil society. They make
three claims. (a) That the problem of bad civil society is more serious for the civil society argument than is
usually acknowledged even in stable democracies like the United States. (b) The problem of bad civil
society requires the introduction of a comparative analysis to get the right angle on the problem. They
argue that the right angle involves asking the question, why do people join “bad” organizations? (c) They
then argue that socioeconomic factors are very important in understanding why people join “bad”
organizations, and this in turn means that we need to put civil society theory back into contact with some
traditional issues of social justice.
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argued, stimulate optimistic attitudes about such processes, which foster trust, a sense
personal efficacy and general satisfaction.
Consequently the chapter demonstrates how participatory processes can connect
citizens to local governance. The conceptual framework, however, is incomplete because
the discussion provokes ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions about mechanisms involved. Thus,
the first section of Chapter III provides an in-depth review of the theory of social capital
and civic engagement, particularly in a context of civil society and people’s active
engagement in civic life and the implications for effective democratic processes. The
chapter explores how the notions of social capital and civic engagement can be defined
and operationalized. It points to the role of these two notions in solving collective action
problems in democracies.

CHAPTER III
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an in-depth review of social capital and civic engagement
perspectives and further examines their utility in explaining relationships between
participatory democracy and democracy satisfaction. I first examine the intellectual
lineage of social capital theory by presenting a brief historical overview of the theory, its
definitions, its dimensions, and measurements. Next, I explore how the concept of social
capital is defined and operationalized by Putnam (1995a, 1995b, 2000). Putnam is a
major proponent of the thesis that social capital and civic engagement are prerequisites
for effective democratic processes. He examines attributes of social resources that
enhance democracy, thus I focus on relationships among different components of social
capital such as trust, cooperation, social networks, and effective democracy.
I then examine dichotomized social capital concepts such as particularized and
generalized trust, bonding and bridging social capital, and weak and strong ties. These
form a foundation for achieving my research objectives. I then discuss strengths and
weaknesses of these dichotomies and focus on their implications for civil society,
effective participatory democratic processes, and ultimately, individual democracy
satisfaction. This section continues with a discussion on links between various
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dimensions of social capital, civic engagement, and democracy satisfaction, as well as an
examination of new a direction for trust and its consequences for civic engagement.
Finally, I review extant research that examines theoretical and empirical
understandings of social capital, civic engagement, participation, and democracy in the
U.S., as well as international perspectives.
3.2 Social Capital and Civic Engagement

3.2.1 Why Social Capital?
Social theory aims to identify principles that make concrete empirical social
phenomena understandable, i.e., general principles that lead to an explanation and
understanding of social relationships (Abel 1952; Mulligan 1960). As a social theory,
social capital is understood across a spectrum of social science disciplines and is widely
used by scholars, policymakers, and practitioners (Kilpatrick, Field, and Falk 2001).
Over the last 20 years, social capital and civic engagement have been used in sociology to
describe social processes and have accumulated a pool of principles that help predict a
range of social outcomes. The widespread use of social capital theory in modern
sociological literature in explaining a variety of empirical realities supports its dynamic
potency as a mechanism for understanding outcomes of individuals and community wellbeing. I approach this study with an understanding that social capital theory and the
notion of civic engagement offers systematically related sets of statements that are
empirically testable. It draws on the theory of social capital/civic engagement as an
explanatory model for achieving a deeper understanding of democracy satisfaction.
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3.3 Social Capital: Intellectual Roots
Social capital has become rather ubiquitous in the analysis of various social
problems by scholars over the last three decades. Although French sociologist Pierre
Bourdieu (1986), American sociologist James Coleman (1988), and more recently Robert
Putnam (1993, 1995a, 1995b, 2000) are credited with launching the theory into its
intellectual prominence in a range of social science disciplines, the notion of social
capital has its intellectual foundation in the early work of Hanifan (1916, as cited by
Putnam 2000) and Jacobs (1961). 1
Hanifan was a state supervisor of rural schools in West Virginia and in his
discourse on rural schools, he raised the importance of community involvement for the
success of schools. He referred to social capital as tangible substances that are important
in the everyday lives of people. Elements of social capital are invoked in his ideas of
fellowship; social intercourse, mutual sympathy, and goodwill among members of social
units (see Putnam 2000). The concept reappeared 55 years later in Jacobs (1961) writing
on urban planning research. She incorporated the concept in her analysis of
neighborhood self-government by arguing that networks in cities are an irreplaceable
form of social capital that are linked to urban prosperity and neighborhood stability
(Jacobs 1961).

1

Putnam is a noted Harvard Professor of Public Policy who has been credited with sparking the current
popularity of social capital in social science research in the U.S. See Robert D. Putnam. “Making
Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.” Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993);
“Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community” New York:
Simon & Schuster, 2000; “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital.” Journal of Democracy.
6:65-78, 1995 and Putnam, Robert, and Lewis Feldstein; with Don Cohen. Better Together: Restoring the
American Community. Simon & Schuster, 2003.
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Portes (1998) cites a cursory mention of the concept in the literature of the 1970s
by Loury (1977) who critiqued neoclassical theories of racial income inequality. By the
1980s, Coleman launched the concept into the consciousness of social scientists (see
Coleman 1988a, 1988b). The indelible intellectual impression left by Coleman set the
stage for Putnam’s contribution to theoretical and empirical advancements of the concept
in the 1990s. Putnam’s theoretical modernization of the concept in the 1990s and his
illustration of its strength as an analytical tool in explaining civic engagement and a range
of social issues sparked an unbridled proliferation of the concept’s use in contemporary
interdisciplinary work.
Nonetheless, a more accurate lineage of the concept can be traced back to 19th
century sociologists (Portes 1998). 2 Portes reminds us ideas about how involvement and
participation in groups can have positive life-course outcomes for individuals and
community dates back to Durkheim’s work emphasizing group life as a solution for
anomie and self destruction. Durkheim’s notion of social solidarity and the idea of social
integration, (which essentially links the individual to the group) were used in explaining
variations in suicide. He found that suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration
of the social groups, of which the individual forms a part (Durkheim 1964: 213). The
phenomenon of networking is also embedded in Marx’s distinction between an atomized
class-in-itself and a mobilized and effective class-for-itself (see Portes 1998). These
early perspectives can be viewed as precursors to the contemporary and more
theoretically refined and coherent perspective - social capital.

2

See Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) for a comprehensive analysis of the early contribution to
trust and associational life by the likes of Marx, Durkheim, Weber and Simmel.
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Social capital has been referred to as a neo-capital theory in contrast to Marx’s
classical theory (see Lin 1999b; 2000). Conceptualization of social capital is rather elastic
and has been assigned a number of different definitions, thus there are divergent
interpretations in the literature. Robison, Schmid and Siles (2002) attribute divergent
definitions to its adoption by various social science disciplines. Despite the divergent and
even multi-dimensional conceptualization of the concept, the ubiquity of social capital
theory in social science can be attributed to its appealing simplicity in explaining a wide
range of social phenomena, such as democratization, social stability, economic
prosperity, and social cohesion.

3.3.1 The Scholarly Value of Social Capital Theory
Over the last three decades, steadily expanding bodies of research have used
social capital to empirically test and predict a range of outcomes from community
cohesion/ development, to crime control (Flora and Flora 1993; Portes and Sensenbrenner
1993; Putnam 1993a; Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer 2001; Wilkinson 1991). It has
been used to predict success of second generation immigrants, as well as economic
success of immigrant communities (Portes and Macleod 1999; Portes and Sensenbrenner
1993; Sanders, Nee, and Sernau 2001). In addition, scholarly work has shown its positive
effect on educational attainment and status attainment (Coleman 1988a and Lin 1999a).
Indeed, Putzel (1997) argues that the magnitude of its utility is in a fashion comparable to
the fate of “human development” and “sustainable development” in recent years.
Moreover, its theoretical constructs have been satisfactorily measured and
extensively tested in extant social and political research. For example, Coleman (1988a)
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was among the first to operationalize social capital as “both parents in the household,”
“parents work outside the home,” “the number of children in the family,” and “parental
expectations for children attending college.” Putnam (1993, 1996) operationalized social
capital as the quality of associational life, newspaper reading, and voter turn out.

3.3.2 Limitations of the Theory
Despite its wide applications, a major problem with social capital is that it is illdefined, with different authors attributing different meanings to the concept (Durlaf
1999). Social capital theory is widely criticized for its imprecision in conceptual
definitions, for a lack of consensus of meaning and effects, an absence of consensus on
how to measure it, and hence, its value as an analytical construct. Questions have been
raised about its heuristic value in light of extensions of the concept (see Portes 1998,
Paxton 1999).

3.4 Social Capital: Definition and Interpretations
Social capital may be broadly conceived of as access to social resources
embedded in social relations and is understood to mean stocks of trust, norms, networks,
and/or reciprocity that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit
(Bourdieu 1983; Cohen and Prusak 2001; Coleman 1988a, 1988b; Paxton 2002; Putnam
2000, 1995; Uslaner 1999a). Like other forms of capital - human, physical, and financial
capital, social capital has value. Its value is found in the ways in which individual lives
are made more productive by social ties (Putnam 2000) and it is accumulated through
social interaction and incorporates expectations of reciprocity. Smart (1993) argues that
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social is the most tentative and least secure of these forms of capital, while economic
capital is the most “objective, certain and enforceable.
The kinds of resources referred to as social capital are social because they inhere
within particular social relationships and are contingent on the sustainability of
relationships within which obligations are contained. If such obligations can be enforced
and imposed on the obliged third parties, then it is not social capital but economic capital
(Smart 1993).
Smart further deduces that social obligation is always potential and once it is
used, it no longer exists, and until then there is no guarantee that the obligation will
actually be reciprocated. No one knows how much they have until they try to use it. In
this regard, Smart suggests that social capital is nebulous because of the ways in which it
is created, that is, through exchanges of reciprocity, gifts, and favors (Smart 1993).
Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) narrow the concepts to action within collectivities and
goal seeking characteristics of its members; conceptualizing social capital as expectations
for action within a collectivity that affect economic goals and goal-seeking behavior of its
members, even if these expectations are not oriented toward the economic sphere (Portes
and Sensenbrenner 1993).
Bourdieu provides a succinct but encompassing definition of the concept, stating,
“Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resource which is linked to
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual
acquaintance or recognition” (1986:249). Social capital may be institutionalized by way
of a title and good family name, but this must be worked for on an ongoing basis. Implicit
in Bourdieu’s conceptualization of social capital is the idea that realized or potential
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resources accumulate from social networks based on mutual acquaintance or recognition
that are institutionalized to some extent.
From Bourdieu’s perspective, social capital is created and sustained through
interactions between individuals and a society that is stratified by social and economic
inequalities. Invariably, one result of social capital is economic return gained through
participation in networks that offer mutual benefits. He argues that privileged groups in
society have potential to maintain their privileges through intergenerational transfer of
social and cultural capital.
Bourdieu’s version of social capital encompasses social obligation, advantages of
connections or social position, and trust (Smart 1993). Bourdieu notes that connection
and obligation are not necessarily unintentional from the perspective of an individual or
collective; instead they are products of investment strategies “consciously or
unconsciously aimed at establishing or reproducing social relationships that are directly
usable in the short or long term” (Bourdieu 1986:251).
Lin (1999b) notes that Bourdieu views social capital as representing a process by
which individuals in the dominating class, by mutual recognition and acknowledgment,
reinforce and reproduce privileged groups that controls various forms of capital
(economic, cultural, and social). 3 People access other forms of capital through social
capital, which allows them to move up the social ladder.

3

Bourdieu conceptualizes four forms of capital; economic, social, cultural and symbolic. Economic
capital (reminiscent of Marx’s productive capital) refers to money, commodities means of material
production, and other material assets (See Smart 1993 and Moi 1991). Cultural capital consists of cultural
goods, including artistic knowledge and educational credentials. Education is an important resource
controlling the access to cultural capital. Cultural capital includes family background, educational
credentials and cultural goods. Cultural capital like economic capital confers legitimacy. With cultural
capital the legitimacy that it confers is regulated by educational and artistic institutions not by the
government. In order to maintain the legitimacy of cultural capital it is reproduced in the educational
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Coleman works within underlying theoretical constructs similar to Bourdieu’s, but
takes a different slant in his definition of social capital. He approaches social capital by
two strands of social action. The first approach is from an economic or a rational action
standpoint, where the actor is motivated by the goal of maximizing benefits. Second, he
sees “the actor as socialized and action as governed by social norms, rules, and
obligations” (Coleman 1988a:S95).
These two viewpoints are evident in his definition of social capital. Social capital
is not a single entity, it consists of “some aspects of social structures and they facilitate
certain actions of actors – whether persons or corporate actors - within the structure” that
produces outcomes that would not otherwise be possible (Coleman 1988a:S98). Coleman
defines social capital by what it does, rather than what it is. “The function identified by
the concept of ‘social capital’ is the value of these aspects of social structure to actors as
resources that they can use to achieve their interests” (Coleman 1988a: S101).
Coleman (1988a) empirically tests the concept in his work on the importance of
social capital in securing human capital. Like Bourdieu, Coleman uses individuals or
small groups as his unit of analysis, highlighting benefits that accrue to individuals or
families through their ties with others (Portes 2000). Coleman concludes that high levels
of parental investment, family social capital, and community networks lowers dropout
rates among U.S. school children. Human capital is crucial for the development of
children’s intellect and is most valuable when social capital is also accessible. Portes
system. Education is the vehicle for the transmission of culture. It is pivotal in construction of an
individual's habits. The “higher class” defines what is to be regarded as culturally worthy for themselves
and others. Social capital we have seen consists of networks of family, friends, acquaintances, and
contacts.
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(1998) points out that the merit of Coleman’s work rests in his elevating the concept of
social capital in American sociology and establishing empirical rigor to the concept.
However, Portes (1998) recognizes Coleman’s limitations in his definition of social
capital; particularly how his vague definition opened the way for relabeling a number of
different and even contradictory processes as social capital (Portes (1998:5).
Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam have overlapping tenets in their definition of
social capital, but they show variance in how they utilize the concept and the social scale
on which they apply the theory (Winter2000). Table 3.1 provides a conceptual outline of
social capital as presented by Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam.

Table 3.1
Summary of Definition, Purpose, and Analysis of Social Capital
Definition

Purpose

Bourdieu

Economic resources To secure economic
capital.
embodied in social
networks. Resources
that provide access
to group goods.

Coleman

Aspects of social
structure that actors
can use as resources
to achieve their
interests.

Trust, norms and
Putnam
networks that
facilitate
cooperation for
mutual benefits.
Adapted from Winter (2000).

Analysis
Individuals in class
competition.

To secure human
capital

Individuals in
family and
community settings.
Highlight the social
context of
education.

To secure effective
democracy and
economy.

Regions in national
settings.
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3.5 Social Capital: A Closer Look at the Contribution of Putnam
In the following section I highlight the work of Putnam who is a prominent and
widely cited contemporary of the theory of social capital, particularly as it converges with
democratic theory and practice. Putnam’s work is highlighted because in addition to his
contribution to the soundness of social capital as a theory, he produced one of the most
influential works on the link between social capital and successful democracies (see
Putnam 1993a). Putnam’s findings have prompted debate and research on the issue of
social capital and effective democracy. His work informs aspects of the theoretical and
conceptual background of this dissertation.
3.5.1 Putnam on Social Capital
Putnam is recognized for refining and introducing social capital theory to political
sociology. His conceptualization of social capital emphasizes informal forms of social
organization such as trust, norms, and networks. He refers to social capital as, "features
of social life - networks, norms, and trust - that enable participants to act together more
effectively to pursue shared objectives” (Putnam 1996:34). He also sees social capital as
the, “norms of reciprocity and networks of civil engagement” that are created by
participation in civil organizations (1993:167). Robison et al., (2002) argue that in the
case of Putnam, the basis for social capital (trust and norms) can be separated from
statements of what social capital can do (improve the efficiency of society by facilitating
coordinated actions) and where social capital resides (networks).
Putnam’s contribution to the popularity of social capital as an intellectual
endeavor began in his widely influential 1993 work, “Making Democracy Work: Civic
Traditions in Modern Italy," a study of regional governments in that country. Supported
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by empirical evidence, Putnam makes convincing and cogent arguments on how social
capital works at the regional level to enhance democratic institutions and economic
development in Italy. He illustrates the idea that social capital provides a key to effective
democracy.
Putnam operationalizes social capital at a different scale (that is in terms of
outcomes for regions and nations) than Bourdieu and Coleman. His studies emphasize the
idea that trust and reciprocity facilitates collective action and fosters economic and
political development at regional and national levels. Putnam used aggregate crosssectional data for 20 regions in Italy. Later in his U.S. study, he utilized individual level
indicators of trust and civic participation in a longitudinal data analysis to come to his
popular conclusion that there is a decline in social connectedness and civic association in
the U.S (Putnam, 1993a, 1995a and 1995b).
In his 1993 work Putnam found that regions in Italy possessing high levels of
associational activities not only had higher levels of social capital, but had more
successful regional governments. Thus, almost identical administrative establishments
that existed in different regions produced notably divergent levels of governmental
performance, which Putnam attributed to differences in associational life and other social
capital resources.
In general, social capital applies to a society's capacity to generate the kinds of
voluntary associations that encourage individuals to cooperate with each other, thereby
sustaining democratic pluralism (Putnam, 2000).
Putnam (2000) conceives that citizens have a disposition towards civic
engagement. However, in Putnam’s 2000 U.S. study his widely known figure of speech
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“bowling alone” exemplifies his concern about declining civic engagement, social trust,
and generalized reciprocity and their negative impact on democracy. Putnam first drew
attention to an impending decline in civic engagement in the U.S. in his 1995 Journal of
Democracy article. He further developed this claim is his 2000 book, Bowling Alone.
There he provides evidence indicating a decline in vibrancy of civil society in the U.S.
since the 1960s. He maintains that the foundation of “civic community" has been eroding
in the U.S. since then.
To summarize Putnam’s theory of social capital, it can be said that it is primarily
based on levels of social and political trust, and on membership in social networks and
community organizations. Faithful to Tocqueville’s “art of association,” Putnam
underscores social capital as the “norms of reciprocity and networks of civil engagement”
(1993a:167) which are created by participation in civic organizations. In practice, this
approach to social capital directs attention to two features of collectivities: the degree of
interpersonal trust and the level of civic engagement (Rosenfeld, 2001).
Putnam’s study of democracy in regions in Italy advances our understanding of
social capital; demonstrating why it is important and how social capital and civic
engagement work at community and regional levels. Putnam’s systematic examination of
the concept “offers both a conceptual and methodological framework to understand and
to measure the development of civil society seen as so crucial to the democratization
process” (Putzel 1997: 939-40). Putnam’s (1993) work on the civic conception of society
has been influential in making social capital a core topic for discourse and research on
democracy and political organization.
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In sum, social capital is broadly conceptualized as: (a) quantity and/or quality of
resource that an actor (individual or group or community) can access; or (b) a resource
that is located in social networks. The former emphasizes the utility of social resources
and the latter emphasizes the utility of network characteristics (Lin 2000). Implicit in
definitions of social capital, is: (a) its ability to generate positive outcomes through
shared trust, norms, and values; (b) benefits secured by membership in social networks
(Portes, 1998); and (c) the desirability of collective understanding and action.

3.6 Social Capital Enhanced in Local Communities
The preceding discussion on Putnam highlights participation in communities as a
core element of social capital. Several conceptualizations of social capital encapsulate
aspects of social-structural features that facilitate certain actions of individuals who are
within a given structure (Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1990). For example Putnam
emphasizes, “features of social organization, such as networks, norms, and trust that
facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (1993a: 35-6).
The following brief segment shows that production and maintenance of collective
social capital is essential for participatory democracy. Among the manifestations of social
capital in communities are civil participation, voluntary work, the development of
associational networks, increased knowledge, and a sense of belonging and heightened
confidence in a community’s capacity and ability to set and achieve goals. The success of
participatory democracy is rooted in civil society and it is strengthened and sustained by
these social capital outputs.
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Brehm and Rahn (1997) contend that multiple institutions nurture habits and
values that lead to social capital formation. Strong social networks enable communities to
solve collective action problems by facilitating cooperation and coordination among
individuals and groups. Individuals are connected to the collectivity, social capital as a
collective asset is imperative, and these collective assets and features are available to all
members of the group regardless of which members actually promote, sustain, or
contribute to such resources (Lin 1999b). Although Coleman’s empirical analysis focused
on the individual level unit of analysis, he also refers to the outcome of social capital at
the community level.
Coleman argues that community connections are important benefits to accrue to
individuals. Social capital consists of the stock of active connections among people: trust,
mutual understanding, shared values, and behaviors that bind together members of human
networks and communities and make cooperative action possible (Cohen and Prusak
2001).
“Social networks have value” (Putnam 2000:19). A community with very high
levels of civic engagement may solve problems by social networking, independent of
governmental intervention. Dalton and Ong (2003) emphasize that participation in social
groups independent of the state develops interpersonal skills and resources that benefit
democratic participation, encourages tolerance and trust in others, broadens world
perspectives, and provides practice in deliberation and decision-making. As Sanderson
notes, “…it is the asocial individual who has few group associations, the one who is not
socialized, who impedes democracy in any area of association” (1943:6). A generous
body of research that promotes an understanding that social capital is a positive resource
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that helps solve problems and which boosts democracy and individual and community
goal attainment. In general social capital is portrayed as a positive resource for
organization of civic life and for enhancing democratic processes. It is depicted as a
powerful source of norms, information channels, and associations that promote group
solidarity, coordination, and cooperation in civil society.
In summary, the relevant literature demonstrates results that support benefits of
social capital for community cohesion, economic advantages, increased productivity,
information flow, mutually accountable associations between public officials and
citizens, democracy enhancement, health and social well-being, lower crime rates, and
higher educational achievements (Bullen 2000; Coleman 1998a, 1998b; Deth 2002;
Flora and Flora 1993; Lin 1999a; Portes and Macleod 1999; Portes and Sensenbrenner
1993; Putnam, 1993a, 1995a, 1995b, 2000. Rosenfeld, Messner, Baumer 2001; Sanders,
Nee and Sernau 2001; Wilkinson 1991). Definitions generally embrace virtues of, and
desirable outcomes wherever social capital is present - a real sense of harmony of
associational life, trust, and polity. 4

4

Despite glowing accounts of the positive side of social capital to participation, there are negative
outcomes as well. Some social associations symbolize the “negative side” of social capital and have
deleterious repercussions for democratic processes. Various authors have drawn attention to the “negative
side” of social capital, such as social exclusion, the use of social capital for malevolent and antisocial
purposes, strong negative in-group solidarity that lead to the domination and exclusion of others are not
committed to democratic goals, (e.g. the Ku Klux Klan). Likewise, inner-city gangs can accumulate high
levels of in-group solidarity and through their strong in-group alliances, but may be negative for the wider
society – negative externalities (see Berman 1982, Bourdieu 1986, Chambers and Kopstein 1995, Coleman
1988a, Durlauf 1999, Keong 2000, Portes and Landolt 1996, Putnam 2000 and Woolcock 1998). The
negative side associated negative repercussions for democratic processes. As an alternative view, the
negative face of social capital is an important analytical tool for examining inherent and associated issues
as they relate to effective participatory democracy. Unfortunately, because of data limitations, I do not
address the negative side of social capital in this study.
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3.7 Social Capital, Civic Engagement, and Democracy Satisfaction
Pursuant of the debate on the relationship between participation and democracy,
Chambers and Kopstein posed the question, “Which is better for democracy, selfabsorbed individualism or associational participation?” (2001:838). The clear answer for
them is, “associational participation holds more promise for democracy” (Chambers and
Kopstein 2001:838). A related body of literature substantiates the view that social capital
enhances democratic engagement and advances the quality of democracy (e.g. Gibson
2001; Inglehart 1999: Joslyn and Cigler 2001; Krishna 2002a; Putnam 1993; Uslaner
1999a). The general verdict is that associational participation and civil society enhance
democracy. Participation in local civic activities provides avenues for individuals to
identify and solve common goals with or without the help of government. Verba et al.,
(1995) argue that political skills within a community are developed as a consequence of
civic engagement in secondary associations.
Given these assertions, I posit that social capital and civic engagement can be a
driving force behind a ‘state democracy-community democracy-individual democracy’
satisfaction synergy, each mutually supporting, reinforcing, and sustaining the other. By
this I mean that social capital and civic engagement can create and sustain democracy in
several ways. First, networks of civic engagement and trust are essential forms of social
capital in democracy enhancement. Communities with high levels of social capital are
usually successful at galvanizing participatory support of the democratic process. A
dense network of local institutions with face-face activities can serve to bind people
together, increase the number of connections, and provide the setting that can potentially
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foster a feeling of trust and individual level satisfaction with democracy which may
ultimately positively impact state level democratic processes.
Further, social capital allows for collective action to advance the common good
and democracy. Putnam (1993) concludes that horizontally organized voluntary
associations that cut across social cleavages are more likely to nourish wider social
cooperation, reinforce norms of reciprocity, and thus, make democracy work. He found
that civic minded individuals are trusting of others even when they differ in opinions
pertaining to important issues (Putnam 1993).
Second, abundant social connections form pipelines for communication though
which political and civic information (current and previous) flow among citizens. Not
only is knowledge made available, a sense of bonding, shared identity, and common
aspirations in solving local political problems affect one’s psyche and can potentially
increase one’s sense of satisfaction with democracy. Finally, the sum total of trust,
networks, norms of reciprocity, associations, and cooperation helps coordinate collective
political activities in communities.
I argue that social capital, as a process, is central in influencing the development
of participatory democracy, and in turn influences the individual’s feelings about the
democracy process. Using the premise that social capital provides a viable avenue for
analyzing satisfaction with democracy, I make the following theoretical propositions that:
(a) People who are engaged in horizontally organized voluntary and other civic
organizations are more likely to express satisfaction with local democracy than those who
are not civically engaged.
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(b) Individuals who participate in civic activities and engage locally with the
welfare of others will have greater democracy satisfaction.
(c) Further, individuals who have high levels of trust in other people, and in
particular strangers, will have greater democracy satisfaction. Therefore, I assert that the
relationship between democracy and trust has a mutually beneficial relationship.
However, as explained in the following section, not all forms of interpersonal trust may
contribute to democracy.

3.8 Trust and Civic Engagement
In this section I elaborate on trust as a main property of social capital and civic
engagement, both of which are important tenets for this study. Some scholars use the
term trust interchangeably with social capital, while others conceive of trust as a
qualitative dimension of social capital (Falk and Guenther 1999). Trust is a multidimensional concept and it may be defined as “… the willingness of a party to be
vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will
perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor
or control that other party” (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995:712). Simmel (1950)
notes that trust is "one of the most important synthetic forces within society" (p. 326).
Trust embraces both cognitive elements (e.g., competence, reliability,
professionalism) and affective elements (e.g., caring, emotional connection to each other)
(McAllister 1995)5.

5

These elements are important for social capital building and effective civic engagement. However, this
dissertation will not focus on these two constructs of trust per se.
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As a socio-psychological concept, trust embraces elements of confidence,
expectation, motivation, cooperation, collaboration, mutual obligation, and reciprocation
working together in a complex social milieu. Trust comprises consciously or
unconsciously giving discretion to another to affect one’s interests and provides social
cohesion for coordination and cooperation for mutual benefits (Hardin 2001; Hiemer
2001; Putnam 1993, 1995, 2000). A trusting society is a civic society and a civic society
is a civil society (Uslaner 1999b).
Putzel (1997) questions the mechanics of trust, that is, how networks and norms
operate to strengthen or weaken individual and group efforts. Although he recognizes
how the existence of networks and norms that underpin trust between individuals and
groups can foster exchange by reducing risks and making behavior more predictable, he
argues that whether or not these networks will contribute to democracy has more to do
with the political ideas and programs transmitted through them. Influenced by Putzel’s
observation, this dissertation makes a connection between trust and people’s satisfaction
democracy works.
Luhmann (1980) maintains that social complexities cannot be managed without
others acting on our behalf. In the same vein, Yamagishi, Cook, and Watabe (1998)
argue that as long as we interact with others, we face problems of social uncertainty (i.e.,
the risk of being exploited in social interaction), which is ubiquitous in all human
societies. They suggest that we engage in social interactions with others to improve our
own material or psychological welfare. Through interaction, however, we make
ourselves vulnerable by exposing ourselves to being exploited by others. Thus in seeking
welfare, we enter the risk of incurring costs. Trust reduces uncertainties and complexities
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of modern life and enables cooperative action. Indeed trust is necessary for civil society
to function and for effective participatory democracy.
Cook (2001) posits that trust relationships are fundamental to the stability of
democratic societies and for conducting social and economic affairs in an organized
manner. Putnam also emphasizes the value of trust as a dimension of social capital.
Broadly speaking, he suggests, the more people connect with other people, the more trust
is established among them (Putnam 1995). Trust aids in enhancing the quality of a
society's social interactions as it promotes cooperation. Trust makes democracy work
(Putnam, 1993). “Trustworthiness lubricates social life” by producing “a norm of
generalized reciprocity” (Putnam 2000:21).
Trust inheres in the individual (Uslaner 2002), but the value of trust in social
networks is portrayed in Coleman’s argument that a group that has extensive
trustworthiness and extensive trust is able to accomplish much more than a similar group
without comparable trustworthiness and trust (Coleman 1988b). Trust makes for a
vibrant community in that it leads people to take active roles in their community, to
behave morally, and to compromise (Uslaner 1999a).
3.8.1 Generalized Trust vs. Particularized Trust
What type of trust is most likely to foster support for participatory democracy and
satisfaction with the way democracy works? A fundamental theme emerging in the
literature is the greater the trust that citizens have for others, the more likely they are to
participate in civic activities. In Chapter II I showed why it is conceptually astute to
distinguish between participatory democracy and representative democracy, likewise, it is
imperative that a distinction be made between forms of trust. In his research on
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democracy and social capital, Uslaner (1999a) theorizes that democratic societies are
trusting societies. The kind of trust that contributes to social capital, however, is trust
that can be generalized to people who are strangers, as compared to trust that is particular
and limited to one’s family or group (in-group). Generalized trust is a foundation for civil
society (Uslaner 1999b); it is a moral idea that links people to strangers (Uslaner and
Brown 2003). Uslaner and Brown (2003) argue that trust is fundamentally based on adult
experiences and participation in civic and political life. Particularized trusters have faith
in their own kind; they are skeptical of strangers and consider them as untrustworthy.
Compared to generalized trusters, particularized trusters generally participate less or not
at all in civic life (Uslaner 1999b, 2002).
Particularized trust tends to create group attachments that cause group identities
that exclude others. This increases factionalism and decreases chances that conflicts can
be settled by democratic means. The idea of strong particularized trust producing less
trust in people in general has also been advanced by Paxton (1999), Gellner (1998),
Hawthorn (1988) and Yamagishi et al. (1998). The benefits of particularized trust are
more likely to occur at the personal and micro-level among people who share frequent
face-to-face interaction, rather than at the wider general level that facilitates democratic
processes.
Conversely, generalized trust (or moralistic trust) helps in the building of largescale, complex, interdependent social networks and institutions accruing benefits at the
macro-level. As such, it is central in the development of effective democracy (Uslaner,
1999a). Generalized trust represents more of a “public-face” role in the utilization of
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social capital and thus provides a context for individuals to experience a sense of
satisfaction with democracy.
Generalized trust is the default expectation of trustworthiness of others. “People
who are high on general trust (high trusters) assume that other people are trustworthy
until evidence is provided indicating otherwise” (Yamagishi 2001:124). This motivates
people to leave the security of established in-group relations and look for external
opportunities. Uslaner (1999a) contends that generalized trust in others leads people to
socialize with other people and to join voluntary associations. It also makes them more
likely to engage in a variety of other collective actions united by common values that are
vital for participatory democracy. He further posits that generalized trust is a moral
commitment and that generalized trusters are usually more optimistic and do not
necessarily base their decisions to get involved in their communities with an expectation
of reciprocity. They have a distinctive outlook on civil society, that is, one society united
by common values (Uslaner, 1999b).
Paxton (1999) argues that the notion of generalized trust is a pertinent feature of
national-level social capital. Generalized trust makes people more willing to interact with
people who are not known well. It motivates people to take part in their communities, to
set goals and solve collective problems, endorse moral commitments, and heightens their
sense of obligation to fellow citizens.
As previously noted, particularized trust operates more profusely at the microlevel, and it makes people withdraw from wider civic life, embracing a more ‘privateface’ in the use of social capital. Compared to particularized trusters, generalized trusters
are more likely to engage in macro-level activities such as identifying and solving
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community problems, voting, using the Presidential campaign fund check-off on federal
income tax forms, giving to charity and volunteering time, and associating with people
who are different from themselves (Uslaner 1999a, 2002). Although generalized distrust
prevents people from engaging in social interactions, Yamagishi (2001) argues that social
intelligence (or social shrewdness) allows people to assess the degree of risk that may
arise from social situations that requires interaction with strangers who might provide the
opportunity for new and beneficial outcomes.6 “Generalized trust allows people to move
out of familiar relationships in which trust is based on knowledge accumulated from long
experience with particular people” (Brehm and Rahn 1997:1008). Given that outcomes
in a democracy are by nature uncertain, this kind of trust is necessary for people to
engage in democratic activities and may even be necessary for engagement in economic
transactions between strangers (see Brehm and Rahn 1997).
Closely akin to the concept of generalized trust and of particular value for
effective participatory democracy is Putnam’s (2000) idea of generalized reciprocity (as
opposed to specific reciprocity). Generalized reciprocity creates social capital by
fostering long term relationships and through mutual obligation and responsibility for
action. With generalized reciprocity, an actor does not necessarily expect a reciprocated
exchange immediately. Putnam (2000) explains: I will do this for you now without
expecting anything back from you now, with the expectation that someone else will do
something for me some time in the future. “….altruistic behavior and obligations will be
repaid at some unspecified time, at some unspecified location, by an unspecified person.

6

Yamagishi, in his 2001 article “Trust as Social Intelligence” defines social intelligence as the ability to
detect and process signs of risks in social interactions. This is different from abstract intelligence, which is
the ability to manipulate language and numbers? It also differs from practical intelligence, which is the
ability to solve problems.
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Generalized attitudes of trust extend beyond the boundaries of face-to-face interaction
and incorporate people who are not personally known (Freitag, 2003). Generalized
reciprocity notes Putnam, reduces transactional costs of daily interactions. Thus when
participants in civil society possess generalized reciprocity, they offer selfless actions in
the short term that they hope will add to cooperation and the welfare of other citizens in
the future.
Highlighting the value of reciprocity, Chambers and Kopstein (2001) argue that
reciprocity entails recognition of other citizens as moral agents deserving civility, even
those with whom we might have deep disagreement. Generalized trust then, upholds the
inherent moral nature of democracy. Consequently people with high levels of trust do not
fear that they will be taken advantage of by following the rules because they expect
others will follow them also (Brehm and Rahn 1997). Putnam (2000) suggests that a
community that has high levels of trust and generalized reciprocity is more efficient than
one that is distrustful, for the same reason that money is more efficient than barter in
facilitating economic exchange. I conclude that efficiency arises because mutual
reciprocity among diverse people eventually becomes part of the internalized values of
civil society.

3.9 Trust Typology
A review of the trust literature reveals a tendency to treat trust as an allencompassing concept. When trust is further dissected it is often presented as a
dichotomy. For example McAllister (1995) identified and analyzed two trust types:
cognitive-based and affective-based trust. Williams (1988) distinguished between thick
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trust and thin trust. Thick trust is the kind of trust that is based on frequent interaction in
close ties relationship. Thin trust is trust in the “generalized other” trust in people who are
strangers - trust in society at large. Uslaner classified trust into particularized and
generalized Uslaner (1999), as well as moralistic and strategic trust Uslaner (2002).
Uslaner’s classification is relevant for predicting democracy satisfaction. A drawback to
this approach, however, is that dichotomies are presented as mutually exclusive
categories.
A typology that addresses this limitation can be developed using an argument that
particularized and generalized trust can be further defined into sub-constructs reflecting
diversity among categories of particularized and generalized trusters.
The typology is based on the theoretical proposition that having trust is better than
having no trust when it comes to democracy satisfaction, and there is a difference in trust
between particular trusters and general trusters. In this regard, I offer a typology that
classifies trusters into four groups reflecting varying levels and combinations of the two
types of trust (see table 3.2).
Table 3.2
Trust Typology
Type of Truster
Skeptic

Generalized
Trust
Low

Particularized
Trust
Low

Particular truster

Low

High

General truster

High

Low

Total truster

High

High
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This typology demarcates four groups of trusters as follows: (a) Skeptics -- those
who are at a low level on particularized trust and also low on generalized trust; (b)
Particular trusters -- those who are low on generalized trust but are high on particularized
trust; (c) General trusters -- those who are high on generalized trust but low on
particularized trust; and (d) Total trusters -- those who are high on both particularized and
generalized trust. This typology refines my research hypotheses.
From the typology we can infer two types of generalized trusters; total trusters
and general trusters. On one hand, general trusters have high levels of generalized trust
and low levels of particularized trust. For example, a person may trust strangers more
than people of their own kind for example family members and friends because of some
emotional abuse in the past, low self esteem, betrayal, or unfavorable memory associated
with family members and those who are of his/her kind. Thus close ties ambivalence
leads him/her to develop caution in trusting family or anyone who wants to share in close
associations - “getting hurt by the one you love syndrome.” Embroiled by cognitive
processes that create personal level distrust, general trusters may be skeptical of
particularized relationships and view relationships with strangers as more positive,
reinforcing, and respectful. In addition, because they are not obligated to be intimately
demonstrative or offer care and concern for strangers, they are more open to socializing
and depending on people who are not close kin or friends with a feeling of relative
security. On the other hand, a total truster not only has healthy personal relations but
he/she enjoys high perceived trust all-around and thus healthy relations with strangers
may increase involvement in civic life and create greater satisfaction with the way
democracy works.
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The typology indicates a type of truster that is the “particular truster.” This group
tends to trust family and friends and be suspicious of strangers. This group is more likely
to withdraw from civic engagement than general trusters and total trusters.
Skeptics tend to distrust all on a continuum of trust, from next of kin ties on one
end, to total strangers on the other end. They border on the line of being doubters,
harboring distrusting beliefs for everyone. Uslaner and Brown ( 2003) also argue that
people who do not trust others will be less likely to participate in civic life. I assume that
total trusters and general trusters will be more satisfied with democracy than particular
trusters and skeptics. In terms of satisfaction with democracy, this typology allows one to
empirically ascertain differences between total trusters and general trusters. I propose that
total trusters should be more satisfied with democracy than general trusters because they
exhibit a higher-order trust than general trusters. Particular trusters and skeptics are
assumed to participate very little in civic life and probably experience very little
satisfaction with the way democracy works. Thus, I hypothesize that:
a) People who are total trusters are more likely to be satisfied with the way
democracy works than skeptics.
b) General trusters are more likely to be satisfied with the way democracy works
than skeptics.
c) Particular trusters are more likely to be satisfied with the way democracy works
than skeptics.
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3.10 Other Forms of Social Capital
This brief section examines social networks as they relate to participatory
democracy. Social capital is an intangible resource that is enmeshed in social networks
and can act as a conduit through which people may actively experience participatory
democracy. Ties among individuals based on trust and reciprocity, for example, are
processes for generating participation in civic organizations and influencing democratic
processes. The underlying logic of generalized trust and particularized trust can further be
understood in the context of Putnam’s dichotomy of bonding (or inclusive) and bridging
(or exclusive) social capital as well as Granovetter’s (1973, 1983) social capital
dichotomy of weak ties and strong ties. Bonding social capital occurs when people with
similar backgrounds, values or interests enter into relationships and work together to
achieve shared goals, “….undergirding specific reciprocity and mobilizing solidarity”
(Putnam 2000:22). These associations according to Putnam are inward looking, close
knit, and tend to reinforce exclusive identities and homogenous groups (Putnam 2000).
Although social capital is relational, its influence on democracy is most profound when
relationships are among heterogeneous groups. Heterogeneity of social connections
promotes linkages with diverse groups and across a broad range of resources or
opportunities (Narayan and Cassidy 2001).
Bridging social capital on the other hand, connects people from different
backgrounds (e.g., different races, neighbourhoods, clubs, religion, and socio-economic
divide) and within the community or outside of the community to work together for the
benefit of their community. These networks and alliances are outward looking and
comprise people of different social cleavages. Putnam sees such connections as essential
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not only for community cohesion but also for democracy and the prosperity of
community and “… are better for linkage to external assets and for information
diffusion” (2000:22).
Like strong ties relationships, particularized trusters are inward looking. Ties are
developed from repeated interpersonal interaction, and can basically be regarded as a fuel
for “bonding social capital” involving homogenous groups and reinforcing exclusive
identities. This form of social capital is good for “getting by” in that it supports specific
reciprocity (rather than generalized reciprocity) and mobilises solidarity. In contrast,
generalized trust fuels bridging social capital which is more externally focused and
“links” people from different socio-economic classes and race.
Linking consists of relationships embedded in institutional arrangements that
support the exchange of power, wealth, and status among different social groups (Putnam
2000; Schuller 2001). Relationships with those in power positions are useful for
furnishing valuable resources. It facilitates links to external networks and information
and is good for crystallizing efficient democratic processes (see Figure 3.1).
Communities with a large number of social ties inherently have potential for high levels
of bonding, bridging, and linking social capital and have more opportunity for effective
democracy.
Linking social capital holds a key position in the overall functioning of civil
society and democratic processes. The key to the success or failure of democratic
institutions lies not in the character of civil society, “but in their responsiveness as
institutions - in their ability to mediate conflict by hearing, channeling, and mediating the

72
multiple citizen demands that modern societies express through civil and political
associations alike” (Foley and Edwards 2001:49).

Social Capital Model (Interactive and Multidimensional)
(linking)
(bridging)
Incoming social
capital from
linkage with another
social capital strata

(bonding)

(linking)

(bridging)
Outgoing capital with
linkage to another
social capital strata

Figure 3.1 Social Capital Model (Interactive and Multidimensional)
Source: Mengistu and Tigineh, 2003.
Granovetter’s (1973, 1983) distinction of the strength of weak ties differentiates
between strong ties, (those between close connections) and weak ties (those between
acquaintances rather than family and close friends). Based on this view, it can be argued
that individuals who are connected to more weak ties have a greater range of associates
and greater opportunities for participation in civic activities and experience satisfaction
with the way democracy works.
Strong ties are established when people see each other frequently over long
periods of time. Strong ties stay within groups such as family, friends and other people to
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whom one is closely knitted. This form of social capital fosters micro-level interactions
and local cohesion. Weak ties are acquaintances; they are relationally defined by
infrequent contact, and those to whom one is “weakly” tied are usually extra local and are
more likely to have different social characteristics and perhaps geographic distance.
Weak ties are more likely to have different social characteristics than members of a
strong tie group. Association with weak ties connects individuals and opens doors to
information flow and increased opportunities. Such ties are essential for effective civil
society and democracy as channels to unknown information and resources that are limited
or unavailable among strong ties.
With reference to social networks and human interaction, an overarching principle
that distinguishes the concepts of weak ties, generalized trust, and bridging social
capital, from strong ties, particularized trust, and bonding social capital is the issue of
“outlook.” The former concepts are “outward looking” and involve resourceful
interaction with diverse groups, while the latter are “inward looking.” The outward focus
of weak ties for example, “serves as information bridges across cliques of strong ties and
can offer people access to resources that are not found in their strong-tie relationships”
(Constant, Sproul, and Kiesler 1996:120). These ties are social resources that are
embedded in social structure and are maintained by norms of trust and reciprocity
(Granovetter 1973). When individuals are seeking jobs or political allies:
….It follows, then that individuals with few weak ties will be deprived of
information from distant parts of the social system and will be confined to
the provincial news and views of their close friends. This deprivation will
not only insulate them from the latest ideas and fashions but may put them
in a disadvantaged position in the labor market, ……Furthermore, such
individuals may be difficult to organize or integrate into political
movements of any kind, since membership in movements or goal-oriented
organizations typically results from being recruited by friends. While
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members of one or two cliques may be efficiently recruited, the problem is
that, without weak ties, any momentum generated in this way does not
spread beyond the cliques. As a result, most of the population will be
untouched (Granovetter 1983:202).
Since participatory democracy is based on an “outward” outlook, social
interaction with distant acquaintances and its success depends on bridges in networks.
The inward foci of strong ties, particularized trust and bonding social capital are
counterintuitive to building participatory democracy, and can potentially undermine
democracy by limiting the skills and dispositions that are necessary for participation in
civil society and for making democracy work.
Despite a high risk of social uncertainty associated with generalized trust (see
Yamagishi et al. 1998), the outward focus of generalized trust that fosters bridging to
diverse groups and communities is necessary for participatory democracy to emerge;
particularly in a multicultural society like the U.S. If participatory democracy embraces
ideals of equality and liberty, then forms of “outward” social capital that generate
collective action are more valuable than “inward” social capital in effecting participatory
democratic processes. In spite of Putnam’s (1995a, 2000) popular claim of declining trust
in the U.S. (see Figures 3.2 and 3.3), Americans are greater generalized trusters in
comparison to other societies. For example, Yamagishi et al. (1998) found that in
comparison to Japanese society, the level of general trust is much higher in American
society. Japanese are more distrustful of strangers, feel a greater sense of security within
established and stable relationships, but are more distrustful of people outside the realm
of particularized relationships.
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Figure 3.2: Trust in the Federal Government (A)

Figure 3.3: Trust in the Federal Government (B)
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In view of the core argument of this dissertation, it follows that there are links
among civic participation and generalized trust and satisfaction with democracy. When
people trust others, particularly strangers, they are more likely to take an active role in
their community (Uslaner 1999a; Walters 2002). Generalized trusters have an optimistic
world view. For them, the world is a good place and in general other people have good
motives. Their stance makes it easy for them to think that people will work locally and
within the wider society. They believe that they can make the world a better place and are
willing to cooperate with strangers for the betterment of their communities (Uslaner
1999b).
Thus, I assert that generalized trust is central in shaping civic behavior. In
addition, people who participate locally in enhancing the welfare of others in the
community - through neighborhood associations, voluntary organizations and faith-based
groups are more likely to influence the democratic process and by extension experience
higher levels of satisfaction with democracy.

3.10.1 Civic Engagement
Putnam (1993, 2000) and (Tolbert et al. 1998) present ideas of civic engagement
that provide a suitable rationale for assessing people’s feeling about democracy. In
particular, elements of democracy are to a large extent experienced by participating in
groups, clubs, and/or organizations. The work of Putnam and Uslaner provides a
backdrop for elucidating how trust and joining and participating in groups and
organizations can enhance people’s feeling of social optimism and levels of local
democracy satisfaction.
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If democracy is limited or non-existent in communities, civic engagement is a
means that helps to bring it into being. Nevertheless, certain kinds of social cleavages
and bonded associational activities that occur within groups may actually impede rather
than advance democracy. I review these issues in the next section.
As mentioned earlier, the intellectual roots of civic engagement has been traced to
de Tocqueville, who alluded to the fact that American Democracy was fueled by town
meetings, associations, and other visible forms of civic engagement. Putnam (1996)
claims that the U.S. still outranks many other countries in the degree of its community
involvement and social trust. However, it is not so much the quantity of civic
engagement; it is the quality that is important for effective participatory democracy.
Civic engagement encompasses a range of specific political and non political
activities such as faith-based civic activities, working with local non-profit
developmental committees, working in a homeless shelter, serving on a neighborhood
association, writing a letter to an elected official, and voting. A civically engaged
individual has potential for a feeling of satisfaction with democracy.
Literature indicates that most civic engagement measures consist of percentage of
civic denominations, number of third places (local places that allows interaction,
engagement and problem-solving), and the number of associations. Putnam measures
social capital by associational life, newspaper readership, voter turn out, and participation
in local associations. Others measures include the number of civic groups and the size of
their memberships in society, size of memberships in sports clubs, bowling leagues
political clubs and so on.
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3.10.2 Civic Engagement and Community
Civic engagement preserves democracy and demands accountability from
officials. Putnam refers to civic engagement as people’s connections with the life of their
communities and not merely with politics (1995:665). Civicness can be found in
individuals or in entire communities. Other proponents of civic engagement and its
positive impact on the social network and quality of life in communities include Lyson
and Tolbert (1996); Tolbert and Lyson, (1999); Lyson, Torres and Welsh, (2001) and
Tolbert, Irwin, Lyson, and Nucci (2002).
Civic engagement has many manifestations in communities, ranging from
individual voluntarism to organizational involvement, to electoral participation (Lyson
and Welsh 2001, Tolbert, Lyson, and Irwin 1998). It can include efforts to directly
address an issue, working with others in a community to solve a problem or interact with
institutions of representative democracy. In general, the literature asserts an idea that
civic participation in a variety of associations is important for building democracy.
Reiterating findings from the work of Almond and Verba (1963) on The Civic
Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Walters (2002) notes that
larger institutions that are close enough to the individual to allow him or her some
participation and yet close enough to the state to provide access to power are a necessary
part of the democratic infrastructure. Societies that possess dense networks and cultures
of association-particularly of voluntary association-manifested in all manner of groups
for sport, religion, neighborhood activity and so on are rich in social connectedness.
Membership in these various groups sustains trust and an ethos of reciprocity and
cooperation (Walters 2002).
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To this end, voluntary associations are a prime means by which the function of
mediating between the individual and the state is performed. Through them the individual
is able to relate himself effectively and meaningfully to the political system (Walters
2002). In other words, secondary associations form a vital part of informal networks that
integrates citizens into the political process. Through participation in associations and
communities, people acquire a certain public mindedness. Through numerous
associations and networks a community is built up in which people trust one another,
regard one another as citizens, and sustain a whole set of expectations about the
responsibilities of the political system (Walters 2002).
In a similar sense, Goodhart (2005) expresses concern about the tendency of some
academics to associate sheer density of associations with the strength of democracy.
Others, he suggests emphasize the habits and values instilled through citizens’ immersion
in associational life. He argues that participation in voluntary associations shape
individual attitudes to consider common values over and above selfish interests. This
sense of common values develops social capital and helps to weaken the power of the
modern bureaucratic state (Goodhart 2005). Galston (2000), in reference to the
multiplicity of functions that voluntary organizations perform, states:
By strengthening social bonds, they can reduce the dangers of anomie.
They can foster the bourgeois virtues that modern democratic societies
need, and they can nourish the habits of civic engagement. They can
help form opinions that shape deliberation in democratic public
institutions. They provide vehicles for the noninstrumental expression of
moral convictions as norms for the wider society. And of course, they
offer opportunities for groups of citizens to conduct important public
work through collective action outside the control of government
(Galston 2000: 69).
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3.11 Is There a New Direction for Trust and its Consequences for Civic
Engagement?
In his recent book, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Uslaner (2002) highlights the
importance of trust in democratic societies, but challenges the established conventional
relationship between trust and civic engagement. Uslaner argues that trust is by no means
the only and rarely the most important factor shaping civic engagement. Further, trust is
not important for most forms of civic engagement. He argues that joining civic groups
may generally be good, but civic groups do not produce trust (Uslaner, 2002). He
observes that civic engagement does not necessarily lead to building more trust among
strangers. He argues that declining trust has no clear relationship with civic engagement
at the aggregate level, but trust has impeded collective action where high levels of
cooperation are important between different groups.
Uslaner’s views are contrary to popular claims in the literature. For example
Putnam asserts that trust and reciprocity are generated from participation in civic
organizations and that there is a reciprocal relationship between civic engagement and
trust (1993, 1995a). Putnam further states that “the theory of social capital presumes
that, generally speaking, the more we connect with other people, the more we trust them,
and vice versa” (1995a:665). He also claims that “trust and civic engagement are two
facets of the same underlying factor - social capital” (Putnam 1995b: 73) and that dense
horizontal networks reinforce trust and civic norms (Putnam 1993a).
Like Uslaner, Claibourn and Martin (2000) argue that the widespread relationship
between interpersonal trust and civic engagement in the literature is overstated. In their
study they found no evidence to support the proposition that interpersonal trust
encourages group memberships. They found only marginal evidence to support the idea
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that belonging to groups makes individuals more trusting. They further argue that the
“theoretical connection between trusting and joining is neither obviously positive nor
generalizable across all groups and individuals” (Claibourn and Martin 2000:268).
Brehm and Rahn (1997) found a strong reciprocal relationship between civic
engagement and interpersonal trust. Thus individuals who trust others tend to join more
associations, and members of groups tend to trust others. Uslaner’s primary notion is that
the forms of social capital such as social network, trust, and civic engagement are not
interchangeable; trust precedes the other two elements. In other words, participation in
organizations does not necessarily build trust and generalized trust is not related to
participation in organizations.
Uslaner argues that most voluntary organizations do have a sufficiently diverse
membership to build trust in strangers. He contends that there are those who join
organizations to meet with people with similar interests and trust is not necessarily
required in such cases. Further, if people become trusters or distrusters early in life, their
worldviews may have already been formed before getting involved in civic life. Uslaner
(1999b) draws attention to Tocqueville’s early recognition of the fact that trust is the
precursor to civic engagement rather than its consequence. Uslaner (2002) justifies this
divergent view by showing that optimism and economic equality are the foundations of
generalized trust. The increase in inequality since the 1970s is the most important single
factor shaping the decline in trust in the U.S. As inequality has increased, optimism has
fallen and led to a decline in trust. Uslaner claims that there has been an overall decline in
civic engagement, but he maintains that this is not related to trust. Instead, Uslaner
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indicates that tolerance and social inequality are critical elements defining the levels of
trust in society.
Cook asserts that we sometimes have acts of ‘pure’ altruism in which an action is
taken on behalf of another for purely moral reasons - that is, it was the right thing to do”
(2001:xv, italics added). Indeed, it could be argued that people participate in civic
organizations not only because of trust but out of “pure” acts of altruism.

3.12 Political Civic Engagement vs Altruistic Civic Engagement
From the early studies of Tocqueville and Verba (1965), and later Putnam (1993a,
2000) associational membership has been shown to advance democratic processes.
Literature shows that there are conceptual variations in the notion of civic engagement.
Civic engagement measures encompass diverse activities from to bird club membership
to bowling and football league membership, to participating in church group activities,
Parent Teachers Associations (PTA) and evangelical church movements. From
volunteering time and giving to charity, to voting and various other forms of political
activities (see Putnam 1993a, 1995a, 2000; Paxton 1999 and Verba et al. 1995). Verba et.
al (1995) note that political activities underlie non political organizations of civil
society. They suggest that:
“Undertaking activities that themselves have nothing to do with
politics – for example, running the PTA fund drive or managing
the soup kitchen – can develop organizational and communications
skills that are transferable to politics. In addition, these nonpolitical
institutions can act as the locus of attempts at political recruitment”
(p. 40).
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Putnam (1993a) emphasizes the importance of non-political civic engagement as
an avenue for effective democratic processes. Putnam argues that positive effects of
membership in associations do not necessarily require that the association be political.
Membership in non-political associations fosters democratic norms and develops skills of
cooperation as well as a sense of shared responsibility for collective endeavors. He
argues; “Taking part in a choral society or a bird-watching club can teach self-discipline
and an appreciation for the joys of successful collaboration” (Putnam 1993a:90).
Exactly how membership in a choral society or a bird-watching club can bring
about increased civic engagement and democratic governmental performance is
intellectually elusive. Perhaps the pathway lies in the notion that people who are engaged
in such group activities tend to have more time and are more open to or optimistic about
participation in civic activities. Also, they may produce children who are socialized into
norms and networks that foster more optimistic views about interacting with others, and
who are more aware of group obligations that may stimulate and develop their interests in
public life and civic engagement. However in this regard, participation is likely to reflect
the social class make-up of such groups (particularized trust). Nonetheless, Verba and
Nie (1987) found that participation increases mainly when people are exposed to relevant
political stimuli. Their findings, however, did not completely refute the idea that even
non-political organizations lead to political participation, as 40 percent of the “hobby
group” sample reported that their group took part in community affairs and 35 percent
said that there was some political discussions in their group.
In attempts to overcome conceptual variations in civic engagement, some scholars
have categorized different types of civic engagement. Verba et al. (1995) for example,
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distinguished civic engagement into political and non political activities. They posit that
political engagement encompasses voting, working for, or contributing to electoral
campaigns and organizations; contacting government officials and attending protest
marches or demonstrations. It also includes activities such as working informally with
others to solve community problems, volunteering on locally elected and appointed
boards.
Parker (1983) also categorized participation into official and non-official. The
former involves individuals playing roles or occupying official positions in organizations.
The latter refers to people who hold a specified position within an organization but they
nevertheless act on behalf of the organization.
Freigtag (2003), in his study of democracy and social capital in Japan and
Switzerland uses active membership to measure associational life and distinguishes
between five different types of associational engagement as follows: (a) political
associations (political groups and environmental organizations), (b) economic
associations (labor unions and professional organizations), (c) cultural associations
(church or religious and art, music or educational organizations), (d) community
organizations (welfare and charitable organizations), and (e) private interest associations
(sport or recreation organizations).
In addition, Acock and Scott (1980) designated a dichotomy of civic political
participation that distinguishes between highly visible behavior and less visible behavior.
They contend that high visibility political participation includes active political behaviors
that can become known to others, actions such as voting, wearing campaign buttons and
working for a candidate. While low visible political participation refers to passive public
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behaviors such as gleaning political information from listening to and watching political
debates in the electronic media.
For this study I posit, when it comes to democracy satisfaction civic engagement
is important, but different types of civic engagement may have different implications for
satisfaction with democracy; therefore, I also differentiate categories of civic
engagement. I argue that civic engagement conceptually reflects different forms of
prosocial behaviors both at the local level and in wider political arenas, and different
forms of civic engagement should have different levels of explanatory value for
democracy satisfaction. To capture this idea I conceptualized two categories of civic
engagement: political and altruistic. Political civic engagement refers to those activities
that seek to deliberately identify and solve public issues, which often require some level
of organizational commitment or at least attending community meetings and voting in
representative politics. I further argue that although people who are civically engaged
generally have interest in solving public problems and believe in the greater public good,
but their activities may take place at the local level, or at the wider societal level.
Therefore, I posit that in the context of democratic processes, political civic engagement
should be split between an element that represents local level participatory activities and
an element that represents wider representative politics (see figure 3.4).
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Figure 3.4. Dimensions of Civic Engagement
Local level civic engagement encompasses activities geared toward strengthening
the socio-political, socio-economic, and overall social welfare of communities. Such
activities engage individuals and heightened their awareness of community problems and
kindle commitment to solving these problems. That means citizens have some input in
local policies and in the creation of self-sustaining social political systems that build their
feelings of democracy satisfaction and attachment to community. Relevant measurements
of local level political civic engagement are as follows: working on community issues;
attending community meetings; contacting a public official or being a member of a local
organization. Representative civic engagement includes those activities that support
broader political regimes and the election of government authorities. A primary measure
of representative political civic engagement is voting.
Charitable giving and volunteering time are other forms of civic engagement. In
the literature charitable giving and volunteering time are pegged with notions of
generalized reciprocity, sympathy, moral obligation and emphatic feeling, all of which
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are associated with altruistic behavior (see Fisher and Ackerman 1998; Murnighan, Kim
and Metzger 1993). For this study, altruistic civic engagement such as giving to charity
and volunteering time, denote pro-social behaviors that stem from empathy and behaviors
that specifically promote the survival of others beyond self interest, and does not
necessarily tie one to organizational membership, or a commitment to attending regular
community meetings. They are free from the kinds of commitment and group
participation that would be necessary to build communities and execute local
responsibilities and tackle long-term developmental goals. Thus, I hypothesize that:
a) People who are engaged in local political civic engagement are more likely to
experience higher levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works than those
who are not civically engaged.
b) People who are engaged in representative civic engagement are more likely to
experience higher levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works than those
who are not civically engaged.
c) People who are engaged in altruistic civic engagement are more likely to
experience higher levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works than those
who are not civically engaged.
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3.13 Social Capital, Civic Engagement and Democracy: Other Relevant Research
Findings
Literature on people’s satisfaction with democracy in the U.S. is sparse. Empirical
research backing the ample supply of theoretical understanding of social capital,
participation and democracy in the US is also rare. Paxton (2002) states that despite the
longtime theoretical association between social capital and democracy, quantitative
empirical affirmations of the relationship are rare and qualitative studies provide little
concrete evidence because they tend to be descriptive and theoretical.
Putnam (1993, 2000) popularized the links between social organization,
democracy and economic growth in political sociology. Putnam’s (1995) path-breaking
essay and his 2000 book, Bowling Alone, drew attention to an apparent decline in
community-based associations in the U.S. The core reason for this he asserts is a weak
civil society in the U.S. that has led to decreased ‘civic engagement’ and ‘social trust.’ As
mentioned earlier, Putnam argues that there is a decline in active group membership in
communities; moreover, those who are joining are not joining the kinds of organizations
that stimulate the formation and development of social capital.
Earlier in this chapter, I alluded to Putnam’s (1993) in-depth analysis of social
capital, civic values and the performance of democratic and economic institutions in
Italy. In this study, Putnam conducted a comparative assessment of regional
governments in two regions of Italy, the Northern/Central region and the Southern region
and showed how social capital can explain regional variations in economic growth and
governmental performance.
He noted that the north central region of Italy was characterized by civic
engagement, trust, tolerance, equality, and social solidarity. These stocks of social capital
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were embedded in horizontal networks of civic engagement which enhanced effective
democratic processes. Putnam found that the north/central regions of Italy had more
lateral social relationships that were based on equality. These regions also had stronger
civic traditions and individuals had higher levels of trust in political institutions. Regional
governments were also strong and successful. On the other hand, and even more
revealing, were the divergent findings in the ‘uncivic’ region of southern Italy. The
southern region was characterized by limited stocks of social capital, apathy towards
politics, more vertical social relationships, and poor civic traditions. In comparison to the
northern and central areas, the southern region was found to be inundated with
malfunctioning regional governments, which Putnam related to lower stocks of social
capital in that region.
The main findings of Putnam’s work highlight the critical importance of citizen
participation, a thriving civil society and social capital in effective and successful
regional governments and prosperous economies. It is not surprising that citizens of the
north/central region expressed greater satisfaction with the quality of democracy and
governmental performance than citizens in the Southern region of Italy.
In another regional study in Italy, Helliwell and Putnam (2000) used social capital
variables to predict per capita output growth. They found that social capital explains
economic as well as political differences in Italy. They used an index of associations
(composing of newspaper readership and political behavior), institutional performance,
and citizen satisfaction with government as indicators. Using multiple regression
techniques they regressed regional output growth in Italy on initial output and measures
of civic community, institutional performance, and satisfaction with government. These
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variables explained differences in regional growth rates and they concluded that the
higher the levels of social capital the greater the economic growth.
In later works, Putnam investigated trends in participation and social capital in the
U.S. (Putnam 1995a, 1995b, 2000). He found that both social capital and participation
have declined. The question thus arises; does declining social capital and participation
matter for participatory democracy? In the context of his research, the answer is “yes.”
The literature is rife with evidence to show that these are the basic resources for effective
civic life and participatory democracy and ultimately individual satisfaction with the way
democracy works.
On another international front, Krishna (2002b) studied sixty-nine village
communities in two north Indian states to examine how social capital and participation
work in these setting. She found that institutions and social capital work together in
support of active participation and concludes that social capital matters and its effects are
magnified when capable agents are available to help individuals and communities
connect with public decision-making processes.
The extent of the importance of civicness and trust in democratic processes can be
illustrated by studies of democratic political organizations. Letki (2003) examined
relationships between social capital and democracy in the formerly communist part of
East-Central Europe and found that the major factors causing low levels of political
engagement are part of the Communist heritage. These include low levels of social
capital (interpersonal trust and membership in voluntary associations) and the antidemocratic norms and attitudes learned through participation in the non-democratic
system. Therefore, she argues that skills and attitudes gained from participation in
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groups, such as voluntary associations or the Communist party, and exposure to the
democratic political processes are more important for the ‘civicness’ of a community than
whether its members trust each other (Letki 2003).
Others have shown a reciprocal relationship between associational life and
democracy. For example, Paxton (2002) used data from a large cross-national study to
assess the interdependent relationship between social capital and democracy. Using
different types of international non-governmental organizations and trust as measures of
social capital, she introduced an alternative hypothesis that social capital can increase
democracy and that democracy can increase social capital through a reciprocal effect.
Her study confirmed the reciprocal effect thesis where social capital was found to affect
democracy and democracy also affected social capital. She further found that associations
that are connected with the wider community have a positive effect on democracy, while
isolated associations have a negative effect.
In the U.S., Joslyn and Cigler (2001) use 1996 pre- and post-election American
National Election Studies panel data to assess relationships between involvement in
voluntary associations and attitudinal changes that are supportive of democratic
principles and system legitimacy. Their study linked individual-level behavior to
changes in national-level attitudes. Using three attitudinal measures of democratic
support: trust in government, external efficacy, and absolute differences they examined
the effects of reported levels of group involvement and attitudes toward democracy.
They concluded that the more group involvement citizens enjoy; the more likely
they are to report a post-election increase in attitudes that are considered supportive of
democratic processes. “The more extensive an individual’s group involvement, the
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greater the likelihood he or she finds that the experience of a presidential election
enhances such fundamental democratic orientations as political trust and efficacy”
(Joslyn and Cigler 2001:366). Joslyn and Cigler (2001) substantiate a link between social
capital (through group participation) and enhancement of democracy processes. In
addition, they conclude that involvement in private associational activities further
strengthens democratic feelings.
Echoing the work of Putnam (1993, 2000), Paxton (2002) confirms that strong
social networks help to create and maintain democratic participation. Invariably, extant
work supports the view that social capital enhances the state of civic engagement and
social trust in liberal democracies.

3.14 Chapter Summary
This chapter provided an in-depth review of social capital and civic engagement
perspectives and further examines their utility in explaining relationships between
participatory democracy and democracy satisfaction. It examined the intellectual lineage
of social capital theory by presenting a brief historical overview of the theory, its
definitions, its dimensions, and measurements. It explored how the concept of social
capital is defined and operationalized by Putnam (1995a, 1995b, 2000). The chapter
examined dichotomized social capital concepts such as particularized and generalized
trust, bonding and bridging social capital, and weak and strong ties. These formed a
foundation for achieving my research objectives. I then discussed strengths and
weaknesses of these dichotomies and focused on their implications for civil society,
effective participatory democratic processes, and ultimately, individual democracy
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satisfaction. A discussion on links between various dimensions of social capital, civic
engagement, and democracy satisfaction, as well as an examination of new a direction for
trust and its consequences for civic engagement followed. Finally, I reviewed extant
research that examines theoretical and empirical understandings of social capital, civic
engagement, participation, and democracy in the U.S., as well as international
perspectives.

CHAPTER IV
PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY: SOCIAL DEMOGRAPHIC
FACTORS

4.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapters forms of trust and levels of civic engagement of
individuals are presented as powerful predictors of satisfaction with democracy.
Opportunities to participate in democratic processes and enjoy some level of satisfaction
with the process, however, are influenced by social demographic factors. The question
arises, satisfaction for whom? In this chapter I argue that satisfaction with participatory
democracy depends on who is participating and the social experiences of the participants.
Opportunities to participate in political processes are not equally available to everyone.
For example, educational attainment, political attitudes, and socio-economic
characteristics of individuals may enhance/constrain political participation, and
ultimately levels of democracy satisfaction. I show that individual citizens as participants
are related to a set of personal characteristics such as social status, race, age, and so on
(Verba and Nie 1987; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) that may constrain
participation.
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In their 1993 article entitled “Citizen Activity: Who Participates? What Do They
Say?” Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie (1993b) found that citizens who actively
participate and those who do not are different in their demographic attributes and
economic circumstances. Moreover, they note that participation differences among ethnic
groups can be attributed to a very large extent to unequal access to political resources and
other vital resources such as education, rather than rational abstention (Verba,
Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

4.2 Race and Age
Race, ethnicity, and gender may be factors that inhibit or enhance opportunities
for participation. Historical factors may also bear weight on demographic composition of
participants in civic groups. Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie (1993a, 1993b) argue that
a major task faced by democracies is the incorporation of previously excluded racial and
ethnic minority groups; groups that have long been the objects of discrimination by
dominant groups. Various outcomes are reported in the literature regarding minority
dispositions, attitudes and participation in democratic processes.
Researchers have found a range of relationships between demographic variables
and social capital. Uslaner (2002) found that African Americans and younger people are
more likely to be particularized trusters. Stolle (2001) asserts that older people in the
U.S., are more trusting. Lin’s (2000) study shows that that social groups based on race
and gender have differential access to social capital. Females and minority group
members have known disadvantages based on structural constraints and normative
dynamics of social interaction/associated networks. Claibourne and Martin (2000) found
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that whites are more trusting, which is consistent with the hypothesis that individuals
with relatively higher degrees of power are more trusting. Speaking to membership in
organizations Verba and Nie note “If one’s education is higher, if one is white rather than
black, and middle-aged rather than young, one is more likely to be an active member in
organizations” (1987:181).
Guided by an assumption that race and age as well as other extraneous variables
may have possible effects on the strength and the nature of the relationship between the
main independent variables and democracy satisfaction in this study I control for race and
age as well as an array of other variables, specifically: homeownership, gender, human
capital, marital status and political orientation.

4.3 Human Capital
Can other forms of capital influence participatory democracy and one’s feeling of
satisfaction with the way democracy works? Although social capital focuses on social
relationships and norms and is measured by trust, values, attitudes, group participation
and membership, human capital centers on individual agents. It encompasses investment
in technical skills and knowledge, and it is generally measured by length of schooling and
academic and technical qualifications. Coleman and Bourdieu have established a link
between social capital and human capital by suggesting that social capital helps in
creating human capital. Lin (1999) shows that human capital induces social capital.
According to Coleman (1988a), human capital is education. To this end, I propose that
people’s level of formal education should influence their satisfaction with the way
democracy works indirectly through its intervening effect on social capital and civic
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virtues. “Indeed, the number of years of schooling is generally the single strongest
determinant of any number of social capital type variables” (Glaeser 2001:40).
People with higher formal education may potentially experience higher satisfaction
with the way democracy works than those with less education on the basis that they
participate more in civil society. Formal education as expressed here does not include
unstructured informal information and knowledge that is provided from membership in
social networks that were described earlier in this chapter.
Individuals generally invest in human capital to increase economic returns, but it
can also have social returns as well as civic returns. Putnam (1995a) found that education
is a very strong predictor for all the various forms of civic engagement including social
trust and membership in different types of groups as well as other forms of political and
social participation. Putnam notes that the two last years at college made twice as much
difference to trust and group membership as the first two years of high school. Even more
striking is his finding that the four years of education between fourteen and eighteen
years have ten times more impact on trust and group membership than the first four years
of education. In this relationship, Putnam found no difference between male and females
or among different races (1995a:667).
Uslaner 2002 found that people with higher education are more likely to be
generalized trusters. In addition, education may instill liberal values, such as the
preference for equality of opportunity and respect for individual rights and liberties.
Education enlarges individual perspectives, whereby the better educated may be more
willing to endorse new political strategies and be more tolerant of diverse political and
social views (Walden-Moore 1999). With regard to predicting democracy satisfaction,
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the assumed relationship is linear, where higher educational attainment increases
potential to improve participation in civil society and advance participatory democratic
processes and ultimately satisfaction with t democracy.

4.4 Other Demographic Factors
Literature suggests that marital status, gender, and social class are among the
chief demographic determinants of participation in political processes. In the following
section I briefly examine effects of these variables on political participation.
4.4.1 Marital Status
People who are married may have a greater psychological stake in the established
order and would therefore be more likely to participate in the political processes to affirm
and boost their commitment to the moral order (Kingston and Finkel 1987). Kingston and
Finkel (1987) evaluated the notion that marital status has an independent effect on
political attitudes and participation. They found that people who are married have a
somewhat higher voter turn out rate than singles. Singles are, however, more disposed to
political participation beyond voting.
Claibourne and Martin (2000) argue that although married or partnered people are
expected to be more likely to join groups because of the reduction in anxiety a ‘buddy’
brings, they found the opposite to be the case. They suggest that this may be so because
individuals who are not partnered participate in voluntary groups to compensate for the
absence of a partner. Given these findings, marital status is introduced in the empirical
analysis in chapter 5 as a control variable to see whether married people are more likely
to experience satisfaction with democracy based on their participation in local problem
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solving and politics. Social class and gender may also affect the way people interact with
each other in a participatory democracy system and ultimately their satisfaction with
democracy.

4.4.2 Gender
Women's low rate of participation at the highest levels of politics is a known and
enduring problem in gender stratification (McDonough, Shin, and Moises 1998; Paxton
and Kunovich 2003). If the principle of equality is upheld in a democracy, marginalized
groups should be adequately represented. Women are underrepresented in national
politics; 13 percent of the U.S. House of Representative and 14 percent in the Senate
(Paxton and Kunovich 2003). Although cognizant that women are more likely than men
to be members of the gender segregated voluntary groups, I posit that women are more
likely to be predisposed to participate in solving local collective problems through
organizing projects and leading local organizations.
The demographic make-up of associations can affect the democratic process.
Popielarz (1999) notes that men and women typically belong to different organizations.
Her study shows that women are more likely than men to belong to gender-segregated
groups. She also found that women are less likely to belong to integrated associations
than are men and that women’s voluntary organizations outnumber men’s groups by
approximately two to one and are generally larger than men’s groups.
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4.4.3 Social Class
The literature suggests that civic participation is linked to social and economic
status (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Uslaner and Brown 2003; Verba, Schlozman, and
Brady 1995). In general, more educated and more economically well off people are more
civically engaged than people who are poor and less educated, in reality participants
generally come from the more advantaged portions in society (Verba and Nie 1987).
Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie (1993a) show that the socioeconomic position of
group members matters appreciably in terms of their ability to express their political
rights and to be civically engaged. In their standard socioeconomic model of
participation, Verba and Nie (1987) claim that the social status of an individual – his/her
job, education, and income – determines to a large extent how much he/she participates.
Verba and Nie (1987) and Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) found individuals with
higher incomes are more likely to join groups than individuals with lower incomes. To
this end inequality is more obvious when participation depends more on contributions of
money than on contributions of time.
Uslaner and Brown (2003) argue that inequality suppresses participation in that,
not only do the poor participate less, but in communities where inequality is rife, the poor
feel that they are powerless and they shy away from participation. They also argue that
inequality leads to lower levels of trust which in turn leads to less civic engagement “….trust rest on a psychological foundation of optimism and control over one’s
environment. Where inequality is high, people will be less likely to believe that the future
looks bright, and they will have even fewer reasons to believe that they are masters of
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their own fate” (Uslaner and Brown 2003:2). Rosenstone and Hansen 1993 sum up the
relationship between social class and participation with the following insight:
“Participation in politics …..has a price, a price that is some combination
of money, time, skill, knowledge, and self-confidence. Some people are
better able to pay the price than others. In economic life people with
money can consume more of (almost) everything, from fancy meals to fast
cars to flashy clothes. In social life people with greater resources can do
more of (almost) everything, from entertaining friends to joining
organizations to volunteering at schools, churches, and charities. So, too,
in political life, People with abundant money, time, skill, knowledge, and
self-confidence devote more resources to politics, not because politics
gives them more return (although it might) but because they can more
easily afford it. Citizens with lots of income can simply afford to do more
- of everything – than citizens with little money. The wealthy have
discretionary income that they can contribute directly to political parties,
candidates, political action committees, and other causes. Moreover,
money is fungible - it can be freely converted into other political resources
that make it easier for people to take part in politics. A car is not a
necessary condition for political action, for example, but having one
makes it much easier to get to a school board meeting, a political rally, or
a candidate’s campaign headquarters. Money can be used to hire someone
to do the daily chores--to clean the house, buy the groceries, cook dinner,
baby-sit the kids—and free up time for politics. Thus, if people want to
participate in politics, money makes it easier for them to do so”
(Rosenstone and Hansen 1993:12-13).
Although the importance of social class and income inequality as
constraining factors for civic participation and democracy satisfaction is apparent,
available data is limited and does not permit empirical confirmation in this
dissertation.

4.5 Home Ownership
Economics is one of the primary factors influencing attitudes toward democratic
processes and it has been found to have a strong impact on satisfaction with democracy
(see Anderson & Guillory, 1997). I posit that certain socio-economic factors for
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example; home ownership, may indirectly impact satisfaction with democracy, through
increased civic engagement. Glaeser (2001) found that homeownership increases the
level of investment in social capital. His empirical evidence supports the notion that
homeownership is an asset and its value is closely tied to the quality of the community.
Thus, it creates a direct financial incentive for investment in social capital (Glaeser
2001).
Similarly, Saunders (1990) examines the growth of home ownership in Britain in
the post World War II period. He found that home ownership and the preference for
home ownership is widespread among all classes in Britain particularly since the 1970s.
He analyzed home ownership mainly in the light of consumer preferences. He counters
the view that home ownership leads to privatized behavior, instead he found that people
who are home owners are more civically engaged because of the ontological security that
they enjoy.
DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) also found that homeowners are more involved in
local communities, working to solve local problems and that home ownership encourages
investment in social capital. They establish that home owners are involved in more nonprofessional organizations than non-owners. They also found that homeowners are 15
percent more likely to vote in local elections and six percent more likely to work to solve
problems than renters. Given these findings, I intend to empirically ascertain if
homeownership influences satisfaction with democracy.
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4.6 Chapter Summary
The preceding analysis supports the proposal that participating in issues
concerning the public heighten people’s interests and confidence in their ability to affect
local decision making and that persons who participate in these issues should experience
high levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works. This study seeks to empirically
assess the explanatory power of various components of social capital in explaining
people’s level of democracy satisfaction. Controlling for social demographic factors, a
National Election Studies survey dataset is utilized to examine citizens’ civic engagement
and generalized trust (social capital) and how these attributes affect people’s level of
satisfaction with the way democracy works in the United States.
The following chapter presents the research methodology. It revisits the research
questions and defines social capital and civic engagement variables. It describes data and
measurements. In particular, the measurement of generalized trust and particularized trust
is discussed in the context of the literature review as well as four categories of trusters;
total, general, particular and skeptic. Next, the analytical strategies employed in testing
the research hypotheses of this study are described. Specifically, factor analysis and
logistic regression are discussed in the context of this research.

CHAPTER V
METHODOLOGY

5.1 Introduction
The principal objective of this dissertation is to evaluate links among social
capital, civic engagement, and democracy satisfaction within the context of participatory
democracy. It addresses four research questions: (a) Are people who are “civically
engaged” and who exhibit “generalized and/or particularized trust” more likely to
experience greater satisfaction with the way democracy works within the current political
environment of a community? (b) What roles do social capital and civic engagement play
in aiding people’s satisfaction with participatory governance? (c) What forms of social
capital and civic engagement are most useful in predicting satisfaction with democracy?
(d) To what extent do various dimensions of social capital and civic engagement account
for differences in peoples’ levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works?
Social capital is not only used for its theoretical strength in this study, but also as
an analytical tool for studying democracy satisfaction among individuals. An analytical
strength of social capital lies in the notion that it can be used as a viable predictor of
levels of satisfaction with participatory democracy. One way that researchers get around
the vagueness of theoretical concepts in social capital theory as alluded to in Chapter III,
is to be specific about identifying and measuring the types of social capital that are
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projected to produce certain outcomes. “Once a concept has been properly measured, the
likelihood that valid and consistent research findings concerning its causes and effects in
some larger social process can be discovered and increased” (Parker 1983:872).

5.1.1 Defining Social Capital and Civic Engagement Variables
In this dissertation, trust is specified as a primary social capital measure.
Empirical measurements of trust as a component of social capital are grounded in the
theoretical interpretations discussed in Chapter III. The theoretical grounding critical to
my civic engagement measures is also presented in Chapter III. In essence it is argued
that associational participation is better than self-absorbed individualism for democracy
to be effective (Chambers and Kopstein 2001). Elements of democracy are to a large
extent experienced by participating in groups, clubs, and/or organizations (Putnam 1993,
2000; Tolbert et al. 1998). The work of Putnam and Uslaner provides a backdrop for
elucidating how joining and participating in groups and organizations can enhance
people’s feeling of social optimism and levels of democracy satisfaction. It is argued
that if democracy is limited or non-existent in communities, civic engagement is a means
that helps to bring it into being. It is also argued that civic engagement conceptually
reflects different forms of prosocial behaviors both at the local level and in wider political
arenas, and different forms of civic engagement should have different levels of influence
on satisfaction with democracy. In order to capture this idea I conceptualized two
categories of civic engagement: political and altruistic.
Uslaner’s (1999a) definition of generalized and particularized trust are utlized.
Variables that capture generalized trust (trust in strangers) and particularized trust (strong
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ties) are operationalized. As mentioned earlier, in an effort to achieve analytical
simplicity; I created a trust typology that delineates more precise measurements of
generalized trust and particularized trust as follows:

Type of Truster
Skeptic
Particular truster
General truster
Total truster

Generalized
Trust
Low
Low
High
High

Particularized Trust
Low
High
Low
High

Precise measurements of trust are derived from the trust typology and are
operationalized by defined characteristics of four groups of trusters: total trusters; general
trusters; particular trusters; and skeptics. This typology clarifies the analysis of empirical
data. In addition, the sub-constructs are measurable and offer increased rigor of
conceptual and statistical models. Categories of trusters identified in this typology expand
the scope of empirical analysis by allowing tests of the impact of trust on democracy
satisfaction. The typology also allows for the identification of low and high trusters as
well as the testing of differences between total trusters and general trusters and between
particular trusters and skeptics.
In chapter III, I hypothesize that total trusters and general trusters will be more
satisfied with democracy than particular trusters and skeptics. This typology allows me
to statistically ascertain differences between total trusters and general trusters with regard
to democracy satisfaction. I posit that total trusters should be more satisfied with
democracy than general trusters because they exhibit a higher-order trust than general
trusters.
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To ascertain this relationship, I first created a generalized trust index and a
particularized trust index. These indices were used to create measurements for four
categories of trusters identified in the trust typology.
The civic engagement indicator consists of three categories to reflect my
conceptual classification that is outlined in Chapter III as follows: local political civic
engagement; representative political engagement; and altruistic civic engagement.
Political civic engagement refers to those activities that seek to deliberately identify and
solve public issues, which require some level of organizational commitment or at least
attending community meetings and voting in representative politics. I further divide
political civic engagement between an element that represents local level participatory
activities and an element that represents wider representative politics.
Local level civic engagement includes activities that engage individuals and
heightened their awareness of community problems and kindle commitment to solving
these problems. Representative civic engagement includes those activities that support
broader political regimes and the election of government authorities. Altruistic civic
engagement such as giving to charity and volunteering time, denotes pro-social behaviors
that stem from empathy and behaviors that specifically promote the survival of others
beyond self interest, and does not necessarily tie one to organizational membership, or a
commitment to attending regular community meetings.

5.2 Data
Data from the 2000 American National Election Study (ANES) were used to test
the following six research hypotheses:
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a) People who are total trusters are more likely to be satisfied with the way
democracy works than skeptics.
b) General trusters are more likely to be satisfied with the way democracy works
than skeptics.
c) Particular trusters are more likely to be satisfied with the way democracy works
than skeptics.
d) People who are engaged in local political civic engagement are more likely to
experience higher levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works than those
who are not civically engaged.
e) People who are engaged in representative civic engagement are more likely to
experience higher levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works than those
who are not civically engaged.
f) People who are engaged in altruistic civic engagement are more likely to
experience higher levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works than those
who are not civically engaged.
The 2000 ANES was conducted by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute
for Social Research at the University of Michigan and comprised of a pre-election
interview and a post-election re-interview. The study population for the study was all
United States citizens of voting age on or before the 2000 Election Day, and who live in
the forty-eight contiguous states. The surveys are based on multistage representative
cross-section samples of citizens of voting age, living in private households. A freshly
drawn cross-section of the electorate was taken in 2000 to yield 1,807 cases. The core
survey involved face-to-face interviewing of 1,000 respondents, the remaining were
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interviewed by random-digit dial telephone sampling (ANES, 2002). Data used for this
study were drawn from the pre-election survey with a sample size of 1,807. For all of the
variables used in this study, I treated the response categories indicating “don’t know”
“refused,” “not applicable,” and “no post interview” as missing categories, thus the
sample size was reduced to 1270 from 1,807 cases after listwise deletions.
Since a specific goal of this dissertation is to analyze selected social capital
variables that adequately predict satisfaction with democracy, the ANES dataset proved
to be appropriate. Not only does it offer a solid dependent variable, but it offers a range
of social capital and civic engagement indicators as well as demographic variables that
are appropriate individual level independent variables for this study.
Although many substantive themes in the 2000 questionnaire are a continuation of
past topics, the 2000 ANES study measured several new concepts including:
•

Democracy Satisfaction – specifically respondents' views on satisfaction
with democracy; and,

•

Social Trust: specifically trust derived from perceptions of the
trustworthiness of neighbors, other community members, and coworkers.

The addition of these new variables by the ANES in 2000 allows me to
empirically examine the effects of trust on democracy satisfaction.

5.3 Measurements

5.3.1 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable “Democracy Satisfaction” was generated from the
question “On the whole, are you satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all
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satisfied with the way democracy works in the United States?” The response categories
are 4 point Likert scale items: 1 = satisfied; 2 = fairly satisfied; 3 = not very satisfied; 4 =
not at all satisfied (ANES 2002). For this dissertation, the categories 1 to 4 were reverse
coded, so that category 4 represents the highest level of satisfaction. A test of skewness
was performed for this variable. A skewness statistic of 0.70 showed that the distribution
was skewed and to correct this, the variable was dichotomized. Thus, for the purposes of
multivariate analyses, I recoded this 4-point variable into binary categories, where
“satisfied” consists of the items ‘satisfied’ and ‘fairly satisfied’ and “not satisfied”
consists of the items ‘not very satisfied’ and ‘not at all satisfied.’ Dichotomizing the
dependent variable is useful because it precisely distinguishes between people who are
satisfied with democracy and those who are not.

5.4 Independent Variables
Multiple indicators of social capital and civic engagement compose my
independent variables.

5.4.1 Civic Engagement Variables
A local political civic engagement index was created by combining questionnaire
items from the ANES that measure respondents’ participation and membership in
community organizations, as well as working on community issues. Also, because one of
the attributes of participatory democracy is the ability for citizens to petition their elected
officials, a question that measures if respondents contacted public officials to express an
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opinion was included. Questionnaire items used as indicators of civic engagement, are
listed in Table 5.1

Table 5.1
Civic Engagement Measurements
Civic Engagement
Index
Variable
Local Civic Engagement
Index

Representative Civic
Engagement

1

Indicator/Questionnaire Item

Responses
recoded:

(a) Involvement in community work
“During the past 12 months, have you worked with
other people to deal with some issue facing your
community?”

Yes = 1 and
No = 0

(b) Contact with public official in the last year
During the past twelve months, have you
telephoned, written a letter to, or visited a
government official to express your views on a
public issue?
(c) Attending community meetings
During the past twelve months, did you attend a
meeting about an issue facing your community or
schools?”
(d) Membership in organization
Not counting membership in a local church or
synagogue, are you a member of any of these kinds
of organizations?” 1
Which of the following statements best describes
you?”
1. I did not vote (in the election this
November).
2. I thought about voting this time, but
didn't.
3. I usually vote, but didn't this time.
4. I am sure I voted

Yes = 1 and
No = 0

Yes = 1 and
No = 0
Yes = 1 and
No = 0
1-3 into 0=
“did not
vote” and
category 4
into 1= vote.

“Here is a list of some organizations people can belong to. There are labor unions, associations of people
who do the same kinds of work, fraternal groups such as Lions or Kiwanis, hobby clubs or sports teams,
groups working on political issues, community groups, and school groups.
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Table 5.1 continued

Altruistic Civic
Engagement

(a) Volunteering Time
“Many people say they have less time these days to
do volunteer work. What about you were you able to
devote any time to volunteer work in the last 12
months or did you not do so?”
(b) Giving to Church or Charity
“Many people are finding it more difficult to make
contributions to church or charity as much as they
used to. How about you -- were you able to
contribute any money to church or charity in the last
12 months?”

Yes = 1 and
No = 0

Yes = 1 and
No = 0

Since the local political civic engagement indicators are moderately correlated
(see table 5.2) a composite score was developed using exploratory factor analyses (EFA)
which reveals that the indicators are unidimensional. Through this procedure I was first
able to choose a set of items from a wider group to be included in the final composite
measures. EFA also allowed me to show that the civic engagement items in the indices
load the same factor, as well as identify those that did not. This was done by principal
component analysis extraction method with an orthogonal varimax rotation. Before
conducting the factor analysis, correlation matrixes were generated in order to observe
patterns of interdependence among civic engagement measures. Four items composed
the local political civic engagement index (“wkcomm” - worked on community issue in
last year, “puboffi” - contacted public official to express views on a public issue,
“commeet” - attend community meeting about issue in last year, “orgmemb” - is
respondent a member of any organizations). Overall, the strength of these relationships is
moderate. Reliability tests were carried out for each factor.
The Eigenvalue for local political civic engagement is 2.019 explaining
65.09 percent of the variance. The Cronbach’s alpha for this composite score is .664.
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Representative civic engagement is a nominal variable that measured whether
respondents vote or not. Alruistic civic engagement was measured by giving to church or
charity and volunteering time represents altruistic civic engagement. Both are treated as
separate binary independent variables.

Table 5.2
Local Political Civic Engagement Correlation Matrix
Worked on
community
issue in last
year
Worked on community
1.00
issue in last year.
.350**
Contacted public
official to express an
opinion in the last year
.495**
Attend community
meeting about issue in
last year
Respondent a member
.283**
of any organizations.
*p<.05, **p<.01.

Contacted
public official
to express an
opinion in the
last year

Attend
community
meeting about
issue in last
year

Respondent is
a member of
any
organizations

1.00
.338 **

1.00

.215**

.324**

1.00

5.5 Trust Variables
As noted earlier, the kind of trust that is more likely to contribute to democracy
satisfaction is trust that can be generalized to people who are strangers, or ‘generalized
trust’ (Uslaner, 1999a). First, I empirically distinguished between the two trust variables
generalized trust and particularized trust. Thus, a generalized trust index was created
from questionnaire items that measured respondents’ trust in strangers. I used the
measure that is most frequently used in the literature, “Generally speaking, would you
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say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with
people?” (See Table 5.3). Uslaner (2002) points out that this question refers to faith in
people we do not know, and it also implies a generalized world view rather than specific
experiences. Other items that comprise the generalized trust index measure whether
people are helpful or selfish, and whether people take advantage of others or act fairly.
Uslaner (2002) points out that it is generally more difficult to get a measure of
particularized trust since surveys usually do not ask about trust in friends and family
members. Although it is generally argued in the literature that particularized trust entails
trust in people who are similar (for example by race as argued by Uslaner 2002), I argue
that the benefits of particularized trust are more likely to occur at the micro-level among
people who share frequent face-to-face interaction; with increased class and residential
segregation, it is likely that neighbors are similar in socio-economic standing and in some
cases by race and ethnicity. For example, there tends to be a spatial polarization of those
who occupy secondary and non-standard jobs in an ethnicity split labor market. Also,
recent work in this area has generally found high levels of ethnic segregation with low
levels of integration in some communities and the growth of an immigrant underclass
(see Borjas, 1994 and Massey et al.1993). Consequently, for the particularized index, I
use questions that dealt with trust among close associates such as neighborliness. This
represents a form of social capital that fosters micro-level interactions and potentially
community cohesion. Items included the following: (a) Are neighbors just looking out
for themselves? (b) Do neighbors treat others with respect? and (c) Do neighbors try to
take advantage of others? I anticipate a positive relationship between these trust
variables and democracy satisfaction. I also expect that indicators of generalized trust
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will emerge with more robust explanatory power for democracy satisfaction than
indicators of particularized trust.
Tables 5.4 to 5.5 provide correlation matrixes for the items that comprise
generalized trust, and particularized trust indices. The row and column variables are
positively correlated. Overall, the strength of these relationships is moderate. The highest
correlation of 0.511 is between the items “People are trustworthy” and “People do not
take advantage, they act fairly.” Since the generalized trust and particularized indicators
are moderately correlated composite scores were developed using exploratory factor
analyses (EFA) which reveal that the indicators are unidimensional. Through this
procedure I was first able to choose a set of items from a wider group to be included in
my final composite measures.
Three items measuring trust in strangers (“trusyes1” – People are trustworthy,
“trusyes2” – People do not take advantage, they act fairly, “trusyes3” – People are
helpful, not selfish) composed the “generalized trust” index. Three items measuring trust
in people who are in close association (“neiadvno” - neighbors do not take advantage of
each other, “respyes” - neighbors treat each other with respect, and “neihnyes” neighbors are honest) comprise the “particularized trust” index.
EFA also allowed me to show that the generalized trust and particularized items
in the indices load the same factor, as well as identify those that did not. EFA produced
an Eigenvalue for generalized trust is 1.953 explaining 65.09 percent of the variance. The
Cronbach’s alpha for this composite score is .731. The Eigenvalue for particularized trust
is 1.744 explaining 58.14 percent of the variance. The Cronbach’s alpha for this
composite score is .610.
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Table 5.3
Trust Measurements
Trust Index
Variable
Generalized
Trust Index

Indicator/Questionnaire Item
(a) Trust (1)“Generally speaking, would you say
that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be
too careful in dealing with people?”
(b) Trust (2) measures whether people are helpful
or selfish, measured by two questionnaire items; (a)
“Would you say that most of the time people try to
be helpful, or that they are just looking out for
themselves?”

(b) Trust (3) Whether people take advantage of
others do they act fairly, measured by the
questionnaire item; “Do you think most people
would try to take advantage of you if they got the
chance or would they try to be fair?”
Particularized
Trust Index

(a) Are neighbors just looking out for themselves?
Measured by the questionnaire item; “I'm going to
ask you a few questions about the people you
regularly see in your neighborhood. In general, with
these people in mind, would you say that they are
just looking out for themselves all of the time, most
of the time, some of the time, hardly ever, or never?
(b) Do neighbors treat others with respect?
Measured by the questionnaire item;
“Again, thinking about those people you see in your
neighborhood, would you say they treat others with
respect all of the time, most of the time, some of the
time, hardly ever, or never?”
(c) Does honest describe neighbors
Measured by the questionnaire item; Would you say
that honest describes the people in your
neighborhood extremely well, quite well, not too
well, or not well at all?

Responses recoded
as:
1 = Most people can
be trusted and 0 =
Can’t be too careful.
“Try to be helpful”
(which indicates trust
in others and
generalized
reciprocity) recoded
into 1 and “just
looking out for
themselves” (no
generalized trust) into
0.
I recoded the
responses “try to be
fair” (meaning trust in
others) into 1 and
“take advantage” (no
trust) into 0.
4= Never
3 = Hardly ever
2 = Some of the time
1 = Most of the time
0 = All of the time
(The higher the value
the higher is
particularize trust)
0 = Never
1 = Hardly ever
2 = Some of the time
3 = Most of the time
4 = All of the time
(The higher the value
the higher is
particularize trust)
4 = Extremely well
3 = Quite well
2 = Not too well
1 = Not well at all
(The higher the value
the higher is
particularize trust)
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Table 5.4
Generalized Trust Correlation Matrix
People are trustworthy

People do not take
advantage, they act fairly

People are
1.00
trustworthy
.511*
People do
not take
advantage,
they act
fairly
.444**
People are
helpful, not
selfish
*p<.05, **p<.01.

People are
helpful, not
selfish

1.00

.473**

1.00

Table 5.5
Particularized Trust Correlation Matrix

Neighbors do
not take
advantage of
each other
Neighbors
treat each
other with
respect
Neighbors are
honest

Neighbors do
not take
advantage of
each other
1.00

Neighbors treat each
other with respect

.264**

1.00

.459**

.385**

**p<.01.

Neighbors are honest

1.00
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Table 5.6
Items Used in the Generalized Trust, Particularized Trust and Local Political Civic
Engagement
Mean

Standard
deviation

Generalized Trust
People are trustworthy
People do not take
advantage, they act
fairly
People are helpful, not
selfish

1.953

Factor
Loading

1.992
1.814

.809
.824

2.35

1.894

.786
.610

1.744

3.96

.800

.758

1.96

.790

.696

1.84

.687

.828
.664

Local Political Civic
Engagement
Respondent worked on
community issue in last
year
Respondent contacted
public official to
express an opinion in
the last year
Respondent attend
community meeting
about issue in last year
Is respondent a member
of any organizations?

Eigenvalue

2.81
3.84

Particularized Trust
Neighbors do not take
advantage of each other
Neighbors treat each
other with respect
Neighbors are honest

Cronbach’s
Alpha
.731

2.019

3.91

1.780

.776

4.17

1.624

.656

3.85

1.812

.787

3.29

1.980

.605
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Table 5.6 illustrates that each factor shows moderate levels of internal
consistency, or reliability, with alpha scores of 0.73 for generalized trust, 0.61 for
particularized trust, and 0.66 for local political civic engagement. Factor loadings range
from 0.78 to 0.82 for generalized trust, from 0.70 to 0.82 for particularized trust and from
0.60 to 0.79 for local political civic engagement, showing fairly good correlations
between variables and the factors. Eigenvalues are all greater than 1.
It was mentioned earlier that the generalized trust and particularized trust indices
were used to create measurements for the four categories of trusters identified in the trust
typology, thus to empirically test four categories of trusters as predictors of democracy
satisfaction, I generated mean values for the generalized trust and particularized trust
indices. The mean for generalized trust is 1.9189 and for particularized trust 2.6528. High
trusters are those with values that are greater than the means, and low trusters are those
with values that are less than or equal to the means. Specific categories of trusters were
computed in SPSS using the following syntaxes:
Total
truster:
General
truster:
Particular
truster:
Skeptic:

Particularized
1.9189
Particularized
1.9189
Particularized
1.9189
Particularized
1.9189

is > than 2.6528 and Generalized trust is >
is < than 2.6528 and Generalized trust is >
is > than 2.6528 and Generalized trust is <
is < than 2.6528 and Generalized trust is <

For analytical purposes dummy variable were created to capture the effect of each
type of truster on satisfaction with democracy.
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5.6 Social Demographic Variables
An assumed basic bivariate relationship between forms of trust and civic
engagement with democracy satisfaction would be simplistic (Patterson 1999). From the
literature, I identified those factors that may constrain the civic behavior of individuals,
and ultimately their satisfaction with democracy. Thus, I isolated seven variables that are
potentially confounding factors as follows: education, age, marital status, race, home
ownership, gender and political orientation. These variables were measured as follows:
(1) Education is measured on an ordinal scale. The categories are less than high
school, high school and greater than high school. The recoded education variable was
arrived from responses to the question that measured the respondent’s years of education;
what is the highest degree that you have earned?
(2) Race is measured on a nominal scale and was recoded into white, black and
other race. This is self reported measured by the questionnaire item; “Respondent’s race
is.”
(3) Gender is a nominal variable identifying the respondent as either male or
female; 1 = male; 0= female. This is measured by the questionnaire item; “Respondent’s
sex is.”
(4) Age was measured on an interval scale by the questionnaire item: “What is the
month, day and year of your birth?” Age is calculated by subtracting the year of birth
from 2000 and has been recoded into a categorical variable as follows: 18 to 34 years, 35
to 54 years and 55 to 97 years (18 thru 34=1; otherwise 0, 35 thru 54=1; otherwise 0, and
55 thru 97=1; otherwise 0).
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(5) Marital status is a nominal variable, coded 1 = married; 0 = not married. This
is measured by the questionnaire item: “Are you married now and living with your
(husband/wife) or are you widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never married?”
(6) Political orientation is also a nominal variable, categorized as democrat,
republican, and other. Political orientation is measured by the questionnaire item:
“Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an
Independent, or what?”
(7) Homeownership is a nominal variable recoded into own, rent, and other
tenure, measured by the questionnaire item: “Do you/Does your family own your home,
pay rent, or what?”

5.7 Statistical Methods
Logistic regression is a main statistical procedure used in this study to determine
the main predictors of democracy satisfaction. This is because the primary dependent
variable; “Democracy Satisfaction” is dichotomous and has binary responses; satisfied =
1 and not satisfied = 0 (see Jennings, 1986). Logistic regression technique allows an
appropriate prediction of discrete outcomes. The objective of logistic regression is to
correctly predict the probability of a certain event occurring, in this case; satisfaction with
how democracy works or no satisfaction. The logistic regression model to be used is
simply a non-linear transformation of the linear regression (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim,
and Wasserman 1996). A "logistic" distribution is generally an S-shaped distribution
function that is similar to the standard-normal distribution. Because the dependent
variable is binary (therefore not normally distributed) OLS regression would violate
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assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity. Also the predictions for the probability
of the event ‘satisfied’ or ‘not satisfied’ would lie outside the acceptable 0-1 interval.
For example, the estimated probability is:
p = [exp(a + BX)]/[1 + exp(a + BX)]
or
p = 1/[1 + exp(-a - BX)]
With this functional form:
•
•
•

if you let a + BX =0, then p = .50
as a + BX gets really big, p approaches 1
as a + BX gets really small, p approaches 0.

5.7.1 Data Analysis
The overall data analysis process began by screening the data to isolate missing
values. The data were downloaded from the Inter-University Consortium for Political
and Social Research (ICPSR). Listwise deletion was used to remove redundant categories
such as “don’t know” and “not applicable” from all the variables. Independent variables
were reverse coded so that they are consistent in the same direction.
To satisfy the certain assumptions of logistic regression such as collinearity and
linearity, appropriate diagnostics were observed. To ensure efficiency of the parameter
estimates, an ordinary least squares regression was used to detect possible collinearity
problems in all logit models. Collinearity exists when two independent variables are
highly correlated with each other; if two highly correlated variables are included in the
logistics regression model then this would lead to imprecise measurement of their
contribution to explaining the variance in the dependent variable. A method that is widely
used to detect multicollinearity problems in Variance inflation factors (VIF). These
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factors measure the extent to which the variances of the estimated regression coefficients
are inflated (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Wasserman.1996). Using a rule of thumb
that suggests that VIFs of higher than 10 is cause for concern (Neter, Kutner,
Nachtsheim, and Wasserman.1996), no collinearity problems were diagnosed in all the
regression models as VIF values are all less than 10
To identify outlying cases I used the Dbeta test (see Menard, 1995). The test
results showed that all cases across for the independent variables were less than 1
indicating no outliers. After performing these statistical diagnostics and data reduction
techniques, I began the next stage of the statistical analysis by conducting a univariate
analysis to ascertain descriptive information about the sample and for each variable used
in this study. The purpose was to facilitate exploration, description, and comparison of
variables in the model. Next, I proceeded with a bivariate analysis to examine the
relationship between various pairs of variables and sets of variable by using the t-test (for
gender and marital status) and one way ANOVA (for race).
As mentioned earlier, exploratory factor analyses (EFA) were then employed for
all composite measures; generalized trust, particularized trust and local political civic
engagement in order to ascertain their factor loadings and to establish their
unidimensionality. Through this procedure I was able to choose a set of items from a
wider group to be included in my final composite measures. It also allowed me to show
that the items in the indices load the same factor, as well as identify those that did not.
This was done by principal component analysis extraction method with an orthogonal
varimax rotation. Before conducting the factor analysis, correlation matrixes were
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generated in order to observe patterns of interdependence among the particularized trust,
generalized trust, and civic engagement measures.

5.8 Regression Models
A series of logistic equations were constructed which attempted to predict
satisfaction with the way democracy works. To estimate the factors that are important in
explaining levels of satisfaction with democracy, I used block regression technique to
produce a set of logistic regression models. Block regression shows how much variance
is explained by the addition of a set of variables to the overall logistics regression
equation. Thus, I began the analysis by first accounting for the effect of several social
demographic variables on democracy satisfaction by regressing democracy satisfaction
on these variables: age, education, gender, marital status, homeownership, political
orientation and race in Model 1. This was done so that I could more precisely ascertain
the effect of my main independent variables in subsequent equations, by removing the
effect of these socio demographic variables.
The socio-demographic variables are all dummy variables and in the equations,
skeptics are the reference category for the trust variable. Other tenure is the reference
category for homeownership, for education high school is the reference category, white is
the reference category for race. Male for gender, not married for marital status and other
for political orientation. In model 2, I added the trust dummy variable. Then local
political civic engagement, representative civic engagement and the altruistic were added
in model 3. Model 4 is the full model where I include all independent variables. Model 5
is the reduced model which is the most parsimonious model, containing all significant
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predictors of democracy satisfaction. The goal of Model 5 is to rerun all the independent
variables that contributed significantly to explaining the response variable.
After running logistic regression models, and before making inferences from
them, the next step was to asses the fit, (Pregibon, 1981), that is, “how well the model fits
the data” (Menard 1995:41). Chi-squared goodness of fit statistics (Model X2) are
reported, which test for “the statistical significance of the variation unexplained by the
logistic regression model” (Menard 1995:22). Thus, for each model, Model X2 is
examined in order to ascertain levels of goodness of fit for each model and improvement
between models. In addition, I report the B estimates (log-odds), exponential (ßs), the
significance levels of all my predictor variables, wald statistic model chi square statistic
and associated degrees of freedom as well as the Negelkerke R2 in chapter VI.
In this chapter, I identified the variables used in the study, explained how they are
measured, and statistically described them. In next chapter the results of the bivariate
relationships and multivariate statistical models are presented.

CHAPTER VI
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the results of the empirical analyses. First, basic univariate
and bivariate results are reported which explore, describe, and compare results with those
of the regression models. Next, it discusses the results of the multivariate analysis. In
order to analyze relationships between democracy satisfaction and the range of social
capital and civic engagement predictors, a series of multivariate regression analyses were
conducted. In addition, changes in parameter estimates when a new block of variables is
added in subsequent models are presented. Finally, research hypotheses are revisited and
the extent to which they were supported by the empirical results is discussed.
The objective of the multivariate analysis is to show which elements of trust and
civic engagement predict satisfaction with democracy for individuals. Several regression
models were estimated. Each regression model is presented separately. Model 1 includes
social demographic variables that examine the extent to which such characteristics
account for variation in democracy satisfaction.
A specific goal of this dissertation was to examine if exhibiting “generalized
trust” and “particularized trust” might account for differences in the levels of one’s
satisfaction with the way democracy works. Thus, in model 2 a dummy variable for trust
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was added. Controlling for the effects of the social demographic variables, Model 2 tests
the hypothesis that people who are total trusters are more likely to be satisfied with the
way democracy works than skeptics.
A third model is estimated to determine if various civic engagement variables
predict democracy satisfaction. Thus, in Model 3 a set of civic engagement variables
were added to the equation (excluding the trust variables). This was done to estimate the
magnitude of the direct effect of civic engagement on democracy satisfaction, controlling
for the sociodemographic variables. In Model 4 all the predictor variables were included
thus it is referred to as the full model. Finally, the results of Model 5 are presented. This
is a parsimonious model that best fits the data.

6.2 Univariate Analysis/ Descriptive Statistics
This section provides information about the descriptive statistics for all variables
used in the logistic regression models. Table 6.1 shows the descriptive statistics. Forty
three percent of the sample is males and 56 percent females. The average education of the
sample in terms of years of schooling is 13.75, and the majority (64.6 percent) has greater
than high school educational attainment. Regarding the racial composition of the sample,
whites are disproportionately represented in the sample accounting for 80.4 percent,
blacks 10.5 percent, Hispanics 4.3 percent, Asians 1.5 percent, Native Americans 1.3
percent, and others 2.1 percent. The age of respondents ranges from 18 to 96 and the
average age of those sampled is 46.94. Just over fifty percent of them are married and
approximately 70 percent own their own home. Thirty four percent are democrats, 26.1
percent are republicans and 39.3 percent are other, the largest percentage.
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A mean of 1.90 on a scale of 1 to 4, with a standard deviation of 0.79 for the
dependent variable democracy satisfaction, indicates that most people in the sample are
fairly satisfied with the way democracy works and that there is moderate variation in the
distribution.

6.3 Bivariate Results
This section presents bivariate analysis to give some preliminary indication of
how the variables used in the logistic regression models are empirically related. I
examine the relationship between various pairs of variables and sets of variables by using
the t-test (for gender and marital status) and one way ANOVA (for race). This was done
as a backdrop for the multivariate analysis. The bivariate analysis allowed me to define
my conceptual models more precisely. Also, the relationships generated in the bivariate
analysis were further substantiated in the multivariate analysis.
There is no difference between males and females with regard to democracy
satisfaction, as indicated by t-tests results (see table 6.2). However, t-test results show
that there is a difference in democracy satisfaction between those who are married and
those who are not (table 6.3).
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Table 6.1
Descriptive Statistics for Logistic Regression Models
Variables
Democracy Satisfaction
Social Capital
Generalized trust
Particularized Trust
Total Truster
General Truster
Particular Truster
Skeptic
Civic Engagement
Local Political Civic Engagement
Representative Civic Engagement (Voting)
Altruistic Civic Engagement
Giving to Charity
Volunteering time
Social Demographic Variables

Mean
0.897

SD
0.394

Range
0 to 1

Freq.

%

1.9189
2.6528
0.56
0.20
0.10
0.14

1.1495
.70452
0.4966
0.4019
0.3001
0.3448

0 to 3
0 to 3
0 to 1
0 to 1
0 to 1
0 to 1

15.2157
3.48

5.091
1.025

4 to 20
1 to 4

1.79
3.27

1.596
1.982

1 to 5
1 to 5

Male
Female

559
711

44.0
56.0

Black
White
Other

133
1021
116

10.5
80.4
9.1

128
323
819

10.1
25.4
64.6

314
561
395

24.7
44.1
31.1

Married
Not Married

684
586

53.9
46.1

Own
Rent
Other tenure

876
354
40

69.0
27.9
3.1

Democrat
Republican
Other

439
332
499

34.6
26.1
39.3

Gender

Race

Education (no of years)

Less than High School (<12 years)
High School (12 years)
Greater than High School (>12years)
Age
18 to 34 years
35 to 54 years
55 to 97 years
Marital Status

Home ownership

Political Orientation

(N=1270 for all the variables)

13.81

46.84

2 to 7

18 to 96
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Table 6.2
T-Test for Democracy Satisfaction and Gender

Democracy
Satisfaction
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed

Sig. (2tailed)

df

Mean
Diff.

Std. Error
Difference

F

Sig.

t

1.601

.206

.631

1268

.528

.0141

.02228

.633

1212.701

.527

.0141

.02221

Table 6.3
T-Test for Democracy Satisfaction and Marital Status

Democracy
Satisfaction
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed

df

Sig. (2tailed)

Mean
Diff.

Std. Error
Difference

F

Sig.

t

37.670

.000

3.068

1268

.002

-.0679

.02211

3.037

1171.914

.002

-.0679

.02234

Analysis of variance tests were run to compare differences among racial groups
(more than two groups in this case) where the null hypothesis is that there is equality of
all means across these groups. The results show that at least one pair of comparisons is
different as indicated by the results; (F= 3.225; P<0.001, see table 6.4). Also I ran a chisquare test of independence where the association between democracy satisfaction and
race is significant, which also initially confirms that blacks and whites have different
attitudes regarding democracy satisfaction.
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Table 6.4
One-way ANOVA for Democracy Satisfaction and Race

Between
Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Square

df

4.924

10

.492

192.197
197.121

1259
1269

.153

F
3.225

Sig.
.000

6.4 Multivariate Results
Tables 6.5 to 6.10 detail the results of democracy satisfaction logistic regression
models. Each model adds a set of variables to assess the relative importance of different
variables on democracy satisfaction.

6.4.1 Model 1
As mentioned in Chapter III, marital status, gender, and education are among the
chief demographic determinants of participation in political processes observed in the
literature. The results show that social demographic factors have divergent effects on the
satisfaction with the way democracy works (see Table 6.5).
The empirical results show coefficients for gender and marital status do not have
significant effects on democracy satisfaction. No significant difference was found
between men and women regarding their satisfaction with the way democracy works. The
regression results for gender does not support my earlier assertion that women are more
likely to be predisposed to participate in solving local collective problems through
organizing projects and leading local organizations, and therefore experience satisfaction
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with participatory democracy. This finding may be explained by wider structural
disadvantages associated with social networks and participation as well as by inequalities
that potentially exist in local association.
However, education was significant which initially suggests that people with
higher levels of education have a higher level of satisfaction with the way that democracy
works. Specifically, the parameter estimate indicates that people with more than high
school education have odds ratio of 1.57 times higher than those with less than high
school. These results corroborate findings in the literature where education has a direct
and constitutive effect on democracy satisfaction (Anderson and Guillory 1997, Glaeser
2001, Putnam 1995a, Uslaner 2002 and Walden-Moore 1999).
Other social demographic factors such as age show significant, but rather small
effects in model 1. Specifically, middle aged people have a lower chance to experience
satisfaction with how democracy works than older citizens. The coefficients indicate that
people in the age cohort of 35 to 54 years have a 41.2 percent lower chance of
experiencing democracy satisfaction than people who are between age 55 and 97. This
result confirms Stolle’s (2001) assertion that older people are more trusting in the United
States, which could impact their satisfaction with democracy.
Race shows significant effects on the response variable. (This association was
picked up earlier in the preliminary ANOVA and Chi-square results). Blacks are
significantly less likely than whites to experience democracy satisfaction. More precisely,
blacks have 50.3 lower chance of experiencing satisfaction with democracy than whites.
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Table 6.5
Model 1:Logit Estimates of Social Demographic Variables on Democracy Satisfaction

Social Demographic
Variables.
1
Homeownership

Democracy Satisfaction
Estimate
S.E.

Own
Rent

2

Education
< High School
> High School
3

Race

Black
Other race

4

Gender

Female

5

Marital Status
Married

6

Political Orient.
Democrat
Republican
7

Age
18 to 34 years
35 to 54 years

Model X2
Degree of Freedom
^Nagelkerke R2
N
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
1. Other tenure is the reference
category.
4. Male is the reference category.

Wald

0.235
(1.265)
0.093
(1.097)

0.406

0.335

0.415

0.050

-0.295
(0.744)
0.453**
(1.573)

0.247

1.422

0.168

7.239

-0.697**
(0.497)
-0.683
(0.504)

0.228

9.294

0.430

2.524

-0.094
(0.909)

0.150

0.400

0.298
(1.348)

0.158

3.548

0.783***
(2.188)
0.804***
(2.234)

0.180

19.032

0.202

15.819

-0.287
(0.749)
-0.530**
(0.588)
74.63***
12

0.214

1.801

0.1865

8.088

1270
2. High school is the reference
category.
5. Not married is the reference
category
(exponential –B)

0.091

3. White is the
reference category.
6. Other is the
reference category.

7. Age 55 to 97 years is the
reference category.
^ Nagelkerke R2 summarizes variance accounted for by the model (SPSS Professional Statistics
7.5)
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The results in model 1 also indicate that there is a strong and significant link
between people who are proclaimed democrats and those who are republicans and a sense
of satisfaction with the way democracy works. The odds of experiencing satisfaction
with the way democracy works are 2.2 times greater for both democrats and republicans
than for people who belong to the “other” category of political orientation. Like
democrats, the odds of experiencing satisfaction with the way democracy works are 2.2
times greater for republicans than for people who belong to the “other” category of
political orientation. Home ownership is not a significant predictor of satisfaction with
the way democracy works.
A Negelkerke R2 of 0.091 for Model 1 indicates that 9.1 percent of the variance in
democracy satisfaction is explained by the social demographic variables. The low R2
suggests that the social demographic variables included in model 1 do not add
substantially to the overall predictive value of the model.
Model 1 also contains fit statistics represented by model chi-square (Model X2 ).
This model has an acceptable levels of goodness of fit, based on model X2 which is
significant at the .000 level (see table 6.5). A Model X2 result of 74.63 with 12 degrees
of freedom is significant at the 0.001 level. This indicates that the goodness of fit of the
overall model is significant and that Model 1 is a better model than the one with the
intercept only.
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Table 6.6
Model 2:Logit Estimates of Trust Variables on Democracy Satisfaction
Democracy Satisfaction
Estimate
S.E
Social Capital (Trust
typology)
1

Total Trusters

General Trusters
Particular Truster

Social Demographic
Variables.
2
Homeownership
Own
Rent
3

Education
< High School
> High School
4

Race

Black
Other race

5

Gender

Female

6

Marital Status
Married

7

Political Orient.
Democrat
Republican
8

Age
18 to 34 years
35 to 54 years

1.209***
(3.351)
0.807**
(2.240)
0.267
(1.306)

Wald

0.219

30.432

0.292

1.467

0.220

7.627

0.185
(1.203)
0.426
(1.203)

0.415

0.198

0.426

0.189

-0.142
(0.866)
0.296
(1.345)

0.253

0.318

0.174

2.899

-0.447*
(0.640)
-0.672
(0.510)

0.235

3.606

0.448

2.243

-0.105
(0.900)

0.153

0.471

0.227
(1.255)

0.162

1.974

0.755***
(2.127)
0.744***
(2.105)

0.183

17.123

0.205

13.086

-0.050
(0.951)
-0.411*
(0.662)
113.90***
15

0.222

0.051

0.191

4.623

Model X2
Degree of Freedom
^Nagelkerke R2
N
1270
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

0.137
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Table 6.6 continued
1. Skeptics are the reference
2. Other tenure is the reference
3. High school is the
category.
category.
reference category.
4. White is the reference
5. Male is the reference category.
6. Not married is the
category.
reference category
7. Other is the reference
8. Age 55 to 97 years is the
(exponential –B)
category.
reference category.
^ - Nagelkerke R2 summarizes variance accounted for by the model (SPSS Professional
Statistics 7.5)

6.4.2 Model 2
When democracy satisfaction was regressed on the variables total truster, general
truster and particularized truster along with the seven social demographic variables, total
and general trusters had a strong and significant effect.
The odds of experiencing satisfaction with the way democracy works are 3.3
times greater for total trusters than skeptics. This effect is significant, confirming the
hypothesis that people who are total trusters are more likely to be satisfied with the way
democracy works than skeptics. Hypothesis II which states that general trusters are more
likely to be satisfied with the way democracy works than skeptics, is also confirmed.
Results show the odds of experiencing satisfaction with the way democracy works are 2.2
times greater for general trusters than skeptics. The effect is, however lower than the
effect of total trusters. Model 2 confirms the theoretical reasoning that there is a
difference between people who are all-around trusters and those who only trust strangers.
The results failed to confirm the hypothesis that particular trusters are more likely
to be satisfied with the way democracy works than skeptics. Therefore the results of the
study substantiates the thesis that while trust is important when it comes to democracy
satisfaction it is generalized trust (total and general truster), rather than particularized
trust that is more important in predicting democracy satisfaction.
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With the addition of the trust dummy variable: race, age, and political orientation
remained as significant predictors of democracy satisfaction. The effect of the political
orientation variable was marginally reduced and the effect of race marginally improved.
Blacks have a 36 percent lower chance of being satisfied with the way democracy
works than whites. The effect of education on democracy satisfaction was no longer
significant with the addition of the trust variable.
Model 2 has an acceptable levels of goodness of fit, based on model X2 which is
significant at the .000 level (see table 6.6). A Model X2 result of 113.90 with 15 degrees
of freedom is significant at the 0.001 level. This indicates that the goodness of fit of the
overall model is significant. In Model 2, the addition of trust variables improved the
model as the change in Model X2 of 39.27 is statistically significant at the .001 level.
Regarding explained variance represented by the Negelkerke R2, by comparing
Model 1 with Model 2, the addition of trust variables increased the strength of the model.
A Negelkerke R2 of 0.091 for Model 1 indicates that 9.1 percent of the variance in
democracy satisfaction is explained by the social demographic variables. When the trust
variables were added in Model 2 this increased to 13.7 percent.

6.4.3 Model 3
While controlling for the effects of the social demographic variables, Model 3
shows that not all forms of civic engagement significantly predict satisfaction with the
way democracy works. While representative civic engagement and giving to charity have
positive effects on democracy satisfaction, local political civic engagement and
volunteering time do not significantly predict satisfaction with the way democracy works.
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The odds of experiencing satisfaction with the way democracy works are 1.9
times greater for people who are engaged in representative civic engagement than those
who are not civically engaged in this manner.
The hypothesis that people who are engaged in altruistic civic engagement are
more likely to experience satisfaction with the way democracy works than those who are
not civically engaged is only partially corroborated. Giving to charity has a positive effect
on democracy satisfaction, but not volunteering time. The odds of experiencing
satisfaction with the way democracy works are 1.6 times greater for people who give to
charity than those who are not civically engaged in this manner.
With the addition of the civic engagement variables, race, age, and political
orientation as social demographic variables, the data continued to be significant
predictors of democracy satisfaction. The effect of the political orientation variable was
further reduced but only marginally. The effect of race decreased, in this model, in that
blacks have a 54.4 percent lower chance to be satisfied experience democracy satisfaction
than whites.
Model 3 also has an acceptable levels of goodness of fit, based on model X2
which is significant at the .001 level (see table 6.7). A Model X2 result of 99.79 with 16
degrees of freedom is significant at the 0.001 level. This indicates that the goodness of fit
of the overall model is significant.
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Table 6.7
Model 3: Logit Estimates of Civic Engagement Variables on Democracy Satisfaction
Democracy Satisfaction
Estimate

S.E

Wald

0.011
(1.011)
0.655***
(1.926)

0.017

0.408

0.182

12.956

0.119
(1.125)
0.479**
(1.612)

0.172

0.475

0.187

6.497

0.145
(1.156)
0.181
(1.199)

0.414

0.122

0.424

0.183

0.254

0.525

0.180

1.921

-0.791***
(0.453)
-0.740
(0.477)

0.232

11.589

0.436

2.875

Female

-0.109
(0.896)

0.153

0.5123

Married

0.215
(1.239)

0.161

1.761

0.706***
(2.026)
0.676***
(1.966)

0.183

14.896

0.206

10.821

0.222

0.120

0.189

4.876

Civic Engagement
Local Political
Representative (Vote)
Altruistic
Volunteer time
Give to Charity
Social Demographic Variables.
1
Homeownership
Own
Rent
2

Education
< High School
> High School
3

Race

Black
Other race

4

Gender

5

Marital Status

6

Political Orient.

Democrat

Republican
7

Age

18 to 34 years
35 to 54 years

-0.184
(0.831)
0.250
(1.284)

-0.077
(0.926)
-0.419*
(0.658)
99.79***
16

Model X2
Degree of Freedom
^Nagelkerke R2
N
1270
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

0.121
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Table 6.7 continued
1. Other tenure is the reference
category.
4. Male is the reference category.

2. High school is the reference
category.
5. Not married is the reference
category
(exponential –B)

3. White is the
reference category.
6. Other is the
reference category.

7. Age 55 to 97 years is the
reference category.
^ Nagelkerke R2 summarizes variance accounted for by the model (SPSS Professional Statistics
7.5)

Comparing Model 3 with Model 2, the addition of civic engagement variables did
not increase the strength of the model. A Negelkerke R2 of .121 for Model 3 indicates
that 12.1 percent of the variance in democracy satisfaction is explained by the civic
engagement variables. When the trust variables were added in Model 2 this increased to
13.7 percent.

6.4.4 Model 4
In Model 4 (table 6.8) all the variables are included. Thus, it is referred to as the
full model. Total trusters remains as strong predictor of democracy satisfaction, although
the effect was slightly diminished, in that, the odds of experiencing satisfaction with the
way democracy works are 2.8 times greater for total trusters than skeptics. This result
suggests that social capital variables may be acting as intervening variables in this model.
.
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Table 6.8
Model 4:Logit Estimates of Social Capital and Civic Engagement on Democracy
Satisfaction
Democracy Satisfaction
Estimate
Social Capital

1.040***
(2.830)
0.688*
(1.989)
0.160
(1.173)

0.225

21.228

0.296

0.503

0.225

5.397

0.784
(1.016)
7.809**
(1.686)

0.018

0.784

0.186

7.809

0.082
(1.085)
0.424**
(1.529)

0.175

0.221

0.192

4.869

0.115
(1.122)
0.239
(1.269)

0.422

0.074

0.432

0.305

-0.086
(0.917)
0.158
(1.171)

0.257

0.112

0.185

0.731

-0.551*
(0.577)
-0.726
(0.483)

0.239

5.293

0.450

2.604

Female

-0.115
(0.891)

0.155

0.547

Married

0.165
(1.179)

0.164

1.008

0.688***
(1.991)
0.644**
(1.904)

0.185

13.778

0.208

9.527

1

Total Trusters

General Trusters
Particular Truster
Civic Engagement
Local Political
Representative (Vote)
Altruistic
Volunteer time
Give to Charity
Social Demographic Variables.
2
Homeownership
Own
Rent
3

Education
< High School
> High School
4

Race

Black
Other race

5

Gender

6

Marital Status

Wald

7

Political Orient.
Democrat
Republican
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Table 6.8 continued
8

Age
18 to 34 years
35 to 54 years

0.079
(1.082)
-0.332
(0.718)
129.45***
19

Model X2
Degree of Freedom
^Nagelkerke R2
N
1270
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

0.226

0.1223

0.193

2.945

0.155

1. Skeptics are the reference
2. Other tenure is the reference
3. High school is the
category.
category.
reference category.
4. White is the reference
5. Male is the reference category.
6. Not married is the
category.
reference category
7. Other is the reference
8. Age 55 to 97 years is the
(exponential –B)
category.
reference category.
^ - Nagelkerke R2 summarizes variance accounted for by the model (SPSS Professional
Statistics 7.5)

Models 4 also shows that not all forms of civic engagement predict satisfaction
with the way democracy works. Representative civic engagement and giving to charity
still have positive effects on democracy satisfaction. Even after accounting for the social
demographic variables, representative civic engagement and giving to charity still have a
positive and significant influence on satisfaction with the way democracy works.
However, the effect is slightly diminished. The odds of experiencing satisfaction with the
way democracy works are now 1.7 times greater for people who are engaged in
representative civic engagement than those who are not civically engaged in this manner.
Similarly, giving to charity has a positive effect on democracy satisfaction, but
not volunteering time. Even after including all others variables, this effect was not
eliminated but it was only slightly diminished. The explanatory power of age disappears
in the full model, but the race and political orientation are still significant predictors of
democracy satisfaction.
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Model 4 also has an acceptable level of goodness of fit, based on a model X2
result of 129.45 with 19 degrees of freedom which is significant at the .000 level (see
table 6.8). In Model 4 the addition of all variables improved the model, as the change in
Model X2 of 29.66 is statistically significant at the .001 level. Model 4 is a good model
compared to model 3. Adding all the independent variables improved the model.
Comparing Model 4 with Model 3, the addition of all the independent and social
demographic variables increased the strength of the model. A Negelkerke R2 of .161 for
Model 4 indicates that 16.1 percent of the variance in democracy satisfaction is explained
by the independent variables.

6.4.5 Model 5
The effect of total trusters on democracy satisfaction was consistent through all
the models. The effect of total trusters on democracy satisfaction is however slightly
reduced in model 5 when compared to its effect in model 4. In model 5 the odds of
experiencing satisfaction with the way democracy works are 2.78 times greater for total
trusters than skeptics. The effect is also slightly decreased for general trusters in this
model, given that the odds of experiencing satisfaction with the way democracy works
are now 1.1 times greater for total trusters than skeptics (see Table 6.9).
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Table 6.9
Model 5:Logit Estimates of Social Capital and Civic Engagement on Democracy
Satisfaction
Democracy Satisfaction
Estimate
S.E.

Wald

Social Capital
1

Total Trusters

General Trusters
Particular Truster
Civic Engagement
Representative (Vote)
Altruistic
Give to Charity

Social Demographic
Variables.

1.025***
(2.787)
0.675**
(1.129)
.583
(1.129)

0.216

24.030

0.290

5.401

0.220

0.302

0.509**
(1.663)

0.174

8.587

0.416**
(1.516)

0.180

5.321

-.556**
(0.573)

0.233

5.672

0.642***
(1.904)
0.672**
(1.958)
117.82***
8

0.181

12.563

0.206

10.622

2

Race

Black

3

Political Orient.
Democrat
Republican

Model X2
Degree of Freedom
^Nagelkerke R2
N
1270
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

0.142
1270

1. Skeptics are the
2. White is the reference
3. Other is the reference
reference category.
category.
category.
^ - Nagelkerke R2 summarizes variance accounted for by the model (SPSS Professional
Statistics 7.5)

Representative civic engagement and giving to charity still have a positive and
significant influence on satisfaction with the way democracy works in model 5. The
effect remains more or less the same as in the full model. The odds of experiencing
satisfaction with the way democracy works are 1.78 times greater for people who are

145
engaged in representative civic engagement than those who are not civically engaged in
this manner. Similarly, giving to charity has a positive effect on democracy satisfaction,
but not volunteering time. This effect remains the same as in Model 4.
Model 5 also confirms that the odds of blacks being satisfied with the way
democracy works is 43.3 percent less than whites. This effect is consistently significant
across all the regression models. This signifies that blacks do not feel that they have the
ability or opportunity to impact decision making for mutual individual and community
benefits.
Being either democrat or republican are highly significant variables in Model 5.
Their strong explanatory power for satisfaction with democracy is consistent across all
models. This finding may be attributed to their affiliation with long established political
organizations. I surmise that even though there is downturn in the number of people
expressing confidence in these two established parties nationally (manifested in a down
turn in voter turn out from 63% in 1960 to 51 percent in 2000 – see Appendix I). These
political parties have greater organization than local organizations, and are generally
more stable and politically viable. Thus, political party membership apparently generates
some satisfaction of being able to influence political processes, legitimized by the
individual being a part of the electorate. Further, many people may feel political bonding
with main representative political institutions even though opportunities to influence
decision making is expressed infrequently through voting.
Model 5 also has an acceptable level of goodness of fit, based on a model X2
result of 117.52 with 7 degrees of freedom which is significant at the .000 level.
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Including only the significant independent and social demographic variables in
Model 5 did not increase the strength of the model over model 4. A Negelkerke R2 of
0.141 for Model 5 indicates that 14.2 percent of the variance in democracy satisfaction is
explained by these significant variables.
This chapter presented the results of the empirical analyses. Basic univariate and
bivariate results were first reported, and then results of the multivariate analysis were
presented. Research hypotheses were revisited and the extent to which they were
supported by the empirical results was discussed. In the final chapter a discussion of
these empirical findings is presented and conclusions are derived.

CHAPTER VII
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

7.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a discussion of empirical findings for the hypotheses in this
study which were drawn from the review of literature. In addition, the chapter presents
the theoretical contributions of the study, its policy implications and several limitations.
Finally, possible directions for future studies are suggested.

7.2 Discussion of Findings
The main purpose of the study is to define and measure components of individual
levels of social capital and various elements of civic engagement and to use them as
predictors of democracy satisfaction. The dependent variable, democracy satisfaction,
was defined as sense of contentment, fulfillment and general optimism about one’s ability
to influence socio-political decision making processes. The research goal is placed
within the context of participatory democracy where it is argued that local level
participation increases the likelihood of achieving democracy satisfaction. More
specifically, I sought to examine to what extent “generalized trust” and “particularized
trust” account for differences in the levels of individual satisfaction with democracy. A
parsimonious typology was developed in which four categories of trusters (total trusters,
147
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general trusters, particular trusters, and skeptics) were delineated and empirically tested.
This typology is based on two elements of social capital: particularized trust and
generalized trust. The typology was backed by the theoretical reasoning that having trust
is better than not having trust when it comes to satisfaction with democracy. Accordingly,
these categorical measures indicate that there is differentiation in levels of interpersonal
trust. The logistics regression results confirm that are the odds to be satisfied with the
way democracy works are 2.58 greater for total trusters than skeptics.
The results failed to confirm the hypothesis that particular trusters are more likely
to be satisfied with the way democracy works than skeptics. Therefore, the results of the
study confirm the notion that while trust is important when it comes to democracy
satisfaction it is generalized trust (total and general trusters), rather than particularized
trust that is more important in predicting democracy satisfaction. It can be concluded that
participatory democracy is impeded in communities with strong particularized trust and
limited generalized trust.
This study also explores how civic engagement affects individual levels of
satisfaction with democracy. To achieve this, I identified three types of civic engagement:
local political civic engagement; representative civic engagement; and altruistic
engagement. These sub-constructs are theoretical contributions to the literature that offer
more comprehensive explanations for democracy satisfaction. Also, categories are
important contributions because previous works have not precisely distinguished social
capital and civic engagement variables when examining democracy satisfaction. This
civic engagement typology allows research to derive more precise conclusions because
previous conceptualizations ignored embedded groups.
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In this regard, I examine how these more specific elements of social capital and
civic engagement increase the likelihood of finding those people who experience
satisfaction with democracy. The empirical results show that not all forms of civic
engagement predict satisfaction with the way democracy works. While representative
civic engagement and giving to charity have positive effects on democracy satisfaction,
local political civic engagement and volunteering time do not significantly predict
satisfaction with the way democracy works. The hypothesis that people who are engaged
in altruistic civic engagement are more likely to experience higher levels of satisfaction
with the way democracy works than those who are not civically engaged is only partially
confirmed. For example, giving to charity has a positive effect on democracy satisfaction,
but not volunteering time.
The study produced important and generalizable findings regarding trust and
democracy satisfaction. In general, generalized trust is most powerful in conditioning
satisfaction with the way democracy works. The hypothesized association between total
truster and satisfaction with the way democracy works is strongly confirmed by the
results of this study. This study shows that total trust is represented by people who trust
strangers as well as family, friends, neighbors and other close associates and it is a robust
predictor of satisfaction with the way democracy works. General trust, represented by
people who trust strangers but not family, friends, neighbors and other close associates is
another important predictor of democracy satisfaction, albeit at a slightly lower level of
robustness. Particular trust which is denoted by people who trust family, friends,
neighbors and other close associates is not a significant predictor of democracy
satisfaction.
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To this end, this dissertation reveals that the presence of trust in local
communities, in and of itself, is not an adequate predictor of satisfaction with the way
democracy works. This study shows that mode of trust is critical; different modes of trust
have different outcomes for satisfaction with democracy. Generalized trust (denoted by
total trusters and general trusters) is more important in predicting people’s level of
satisfaction with democracy than particularized trust.
Therefore, the proposition can be derived that generalized trust is a better
activator of participatory democracy because it reflects deeper and more internalized
values of concern for public welfare by the individual. Generalized trust reflects a
worldview shaped by experience and deep values (see Uslaner 1999a).
As with trust, not all types of civic engagement variables predict satisfaction with
the way democracy works. The study confirms the hypothesis that people who are
engaged in representative civic engagement (voting) are more likely to experience higher
levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works than those who do not vote. It
seems, therefore, that purposive action by individuals in wider representative politics
conveys some affinity to local participation and a sense of satisfaction with participatory
democracy at the local level. This may be because people who express high levels of
satisfaction with democracy experience psychological empowerment, a sense of personal
efficacy, and the ability to influence democratic processes in the local communities. For
example, Deth (2002) reviewed several recent empirical analyses of social capital and
democracy and concluded that positive and direct relationships have been found between
voting and participation in voluntary organizations.
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This strong link between representative civic engagement and democracy
satisfaction is an important finding in light of the fact that Putnam (1995, 2000)
articulates a view of general decline in voter turnout. He associates this decline to a
general down turn in interpersonal ties and ties with the political system in the U.S. He
also makes the point that declining civic engagement has deleterious effects on
democracy. Thus, it could be argued that if voting is a predictor of democracy
satisfaction, and that lack of satisfaction with democracy may be attributed to a down
turn in voter turnout. Prior to Putnam’s Bowling Alone, findings that sparked the renewed
concerns in the overall decline of civic engagement and social connectedness within
communities, Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) found a decline in national level
engagements and noted that participation in American national elections fell by nearly 13
percent between 1960 and 1988. In addition, their 1988 findings revealed that citizens
were considerably less likely than they were three decades before to contribute time or
money to a political party or candidate, to attend political meetings or rallies, or to try to
convince others to vote. The US Census Bureau (2002) found that only 60% of citizens
in the U.S. voted in 2000. Skocpol and Fiorina (1999) also found that civic engagement is
declining in the U.S. and they noted that since the 1960s, the voting rate for the general
population has dropped by 25 percent. In this vein, I conclude if representative civic
engagement is a good predictor of satisfaction with local level democracy, declining
voter turn out should become a major policy concern in the U.S.
The study also shows that giving to church and charity, as an element of altruistic
civic engagement, is a good predictor of democracy satisfaction, but this was not the case
for volunteering time. Implications are that people who give to church and charities have
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some confidence in the ability of these organizations to take care of the general survival
and welfare needs of others in their communities. Such individuals display generalized
trust and faith in generalized reciprocity. In a sense, they are solving the problems of
people who are strangers and who are different from themselves; and, they are also
indirectly affecting the decision making processes in these organizations.
Some people who volunteer time (which is assumed to be more likely at the local
level) on the other hand, may feel that at a personal level they help others but they do not
necessarily derive a sense civic empowerment, or contentment, fulfillment and general
optimism about their ability to influence socio-political decision making processes within
their community.
Moreover, and in concurrence with Stolle (2001), for such individuals
volunteering involves trusting and associating with people of their own kind
(particularized trust), and this form of particularistic volunteering does not foster
generalized trust which is key for promoting satisfaction with democracy. The
particularistic nature of volunteering is underscored by Parker (1983) as he draws
attention to the earlier work of Booth et al. (1968), who found that participation in
voluntary groups, correlates with socio-economic status, and Cohen and Kapsis (1978)
who found a correlation between volunteering and race and ethnicity. For other
individuals, volunteering time may be deliberately and rationally expended for personal
interest and gain, and not necessarily to support wider public good. For example, some
people may volunteer time to improve their chance for future employment (see Day and
Devlin 1998).
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Even though it has been widely argued that an engaged citizenry is at the center of
participatory democracy, the study failed to confirm the assertion that local political civic
engagement would in fact increase an individual’s level of satisfaction with the way
democracy works. This is contrary to Tocquevillian precepts. This is a surprising result as
one would expect that actual participation in local civic engagement (over and above
representative civic engagement) would be the most viable way of influencing local
decision making and identifying and resolving public concerns both within the political
and non-political realms.
These findings imply that in practice, local political civic engagement does not
predict satisfaction with the way democracy works after controlling for social
demographic variables. This counterintuitive finding may be attributed to the fact that
participation in local political civic organizations may not enhance an individual’s ability
to participate in the community decision making process per se - that is “Making
Decisions” as against “Making Demands” (Radcliff and Wingenbach 2000). This marks
an intersection of some of the negative faces of social capital and “bad” civil society.
Although Putnam (1993a) argued that dense horizontal networks strengthen trust and
civic norms, he also draws our attention to the fact that while associations can inculcate
habits of cooperation, solidarity and public- spirit-mindedness (Putnam 1993a), it can
have some social networking in groups can have detrimental effects for the wider
community (Putnam 1995). Further other civic groups that are separated by class and
ethnicity may build within group cooperation and trust, but discourage “out-group”
affiliations leading to the reinforcement of particularized trust and attitudes. In some
cases, by generally reflecting the lopsided balance of class, ethnic and sexual power,
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organizations of civil society tend to inevitably “privilege the privileged” and
“marginalize the marginalized” (Fatton 1995). Some group members may feel left out of
the decision making processes, or feel that their opinions are irrelevant even when they
are civically engaged.
Civically engaged group members may not necessarily have a voice because there
is poor “internal organizational democracy” that represents citizens' interests, or deficient
“internal organizational democracy.” What then is internal organizational democracy? It
exemplifies high level connectedness and trust among local group members, which
enhances the ability of all group members to effectively engage in dialogue with each
other regardless of position on a hierarchical stratum, maintaining mutual respect at all
levels in affecting and achieving collective goals. If this condition is not pervasive, then
not all types of local political civic engagement within the community contribute to a
feeling of satisfaction with the way democracy works. Local political engagement should
allow all participants some meaningful control over the decisions that affect them, if
satisfaction with the way democracy works is to be heightened.
As noted earlier, Putnam (1993) found that civic engagement is important to the
extent that a community with very high levels of civic engagement may solve problems
by social networking, independent of governmental intervention. But not all local
political organizations and institutions offer horizontal participation of all members in
decision-making. Some group members may merely be present without making
decisions. Local level political civic organizations are not necessarily nonhierarchical or
based on equality, which is an essential ingredient for “civicness.” Participants may not
only be unequal in power or status, but it is highly plausible that the struggle for position
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and power that pervades state and federal level bodies has infiltrated hierarchically
structured local level civil organizations which keep some members out of decisionmaking. Thus, “patron–client” relationships can find their way into local civic
organizations, rather than horizontal ties. Hearkening back to elements of elitist theory,
political elites within communities are likely to be decision makers whose power plays a
stronger role within organizations. "It is the irony of democracy that the responsibility
for the survival of liberal democratic values depends on elites, not masses.” (Dye and
Ziegler 1970:229).
The lack of democracy satisfaction among people who participate in local
political civic engagement may be linked to particularized trust and the idea of diversity
as an opportunity constraint. Diversity may not be evident in group membership, as
previously observed by Uslaner (1999b). He noted that most organizations do not have
the diversity in membership that is required to cultivate trust in strangers. He further
argues that people join organization to socialize with people who have similar interests
(bonding), which does not require building trust. Sticking with people like one’s self does
not create the opportunity to bond with those who are different. Uslaner (2002) also
argues that ethnic or racial segregation is a barrier to the formation of generalized trust,
particularly when racial and ethnic minority groups feel excluded from power and wider
resources.
Further, the motivation of group members may be divergent. The possibility
exists that some people participate in civic activities for egoistic interests rather than for
pure altruistic reasons. This maximizes their personal utility. Thus, their identity with the
outcome would be personal satisfaction rather than a desire to support the interests of the
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community. They have a weak obligation to community. Their behavior may reflect some
underlying rational calculation based on self-interest. People who are interested in
elevating themselves may not necessarily work toward participatory democracy or toward
experiencing satisfaction with the way democracy works. Others may participate but
may feel that there has been a violation of their expectation of generalized reciprocity;
and, therefore they would feel minimal satisfaction from participating.

7.3 Policy Implications
Participation in community decision-making is a key element in an individual’s
sense of satisfaction with the way democracy works. Given the importance of
generalized trust in the prediction of satisfaction with the way democracy works and the
observed decline in generalized trust in the U.S. reported by (Putnam, 2000), findings of
this study should spark policy concern for this issue, particularly in efforts that address
generalized trust. Should generalized trust be given primacy over civic engagement in
policy development geared toward participatory democracy? It is comprehensible that
collaborative networks and associations are equally integral to society.
Consequently, policy implications of the findings of this research are diverse.
First, increasing the powers of local and regional decision-making bodies (local
institutions, faith-based bodies and voluntary organizations) is not sufficient for effective
participatory democracy. Neither is the density of local political civic organizations
within a community by itself a determinant of individual level efficacy and satisfaction
with the way democracy works. On the issue of democracy satisfaction, an abundance of
local political civic organizations within the community may not achieve full democratic
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potential. Thus, policies that encourage the formation of and participation in local groups
alone may be counterintuitive if generalized trust is not present in local communities.
Then again, the popular slant in the literature is participation in local groups is vital, as
social networks build generalized trust and cooperation in communities, as people work
together in groups (see Putnam. 1993a, 1995 and 2000). Putnam (1995), for example,
notes that people who join organizations are people who trust. He suggests that causation
direction is derived from joining to trusting.
Second, given the strong generalized trust and democracy satisfaction
complementarities, if community members are not predisposed to total and general trust
and harbor feelings that they cannot effectively influence the process of local
administration responsibilities and affect community deliberations, participatory
democracy may be underdeveloped. The findings of this research beg the question –
“how can generalized trust be rapidly increased in local communities?” If generalized
trust is low in local communities, then participatory democracy is impeded. Implicit in
the notion of effective participatory democracy is the need for generalized trust since
coercion is not tied to the process. Situations that foster the democratic ideal of equality
and “local civic organizational democracy” allow all members to actively participate in
consensus decision-making processes. This is more critical in building people’s level of
satisfaction with the way democracy works. Trust-based collaborative networks that
acknowledge and deal with opportunity constraint factors are necessary for true
democratization at the local level. Thus, in promoting prudent policies for generalized
trust new initiatives should be developed and approached through the eyes of people who
normally have few, if any, chances to influence the decision making process.
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Third, since contemporary policies in the U.S. have largely been driven by the
decentralization of public responsibilities and power, participatory democracy is central
in aiding socio-political processes. In the current political environment, and in a country
where democracy is largely fully institutionalized, more attention should be placed on
participatory democracy and investment in cognitive resources that generate generalized
trust. Therefore, micro-level policy mechanisms that develop, support and sustain moral
trust are essential. As Radcliff and Wingenbach (2000) imply, participatory democracy
unlike representative democracy involves “making decisions” that psychologically
engages the individual. Public policy should focus on promoting generalized trust and
organizational democracy in local communities. Generalized trust is shown to be a strong
predictor of how satisfied people feel with the way democracy works. It underpins the
devolution of federal governance as it spreads to diverse sites (in civic associations,
partnerships and local communities). Generalized trust enhances levels of satisfaction
with the way democracy works (and ultimately the building of democratic communities).
Promoting types of civic engagement opportunities that increase peoples’ involvement in
consensus decision-making is a necessary component of participatory democracy. It
should build people’s satisfaction with the way democracy works. Policies and programs
that foster civic engagement, even at a minimum level, are essential in an environment
where there is a sense of sharing equally in a common political culture with a common
heritage, a common present, and a common destiny among individuals (see Patterson
1999).
Finally, from a policy perspective, I can conclude from this research that high
levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works can re-affirm participatory
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democracy. In addition, the degree to which local civic organizations establish
community linkages can impact people’s feeling of democracy satisfaction as people may
feel a sense of mutual cooperation when they feel attached to an organization’s mission.
If individuals feel a sense of dissidence with the organization, a feeling of apathy and
eventual disillusionment with the democratic process may ensue. It is important that such
feelings be curbed because as decentralization becomes more ingrained and the U.S.
government pursues strategies that promote people-centered development, increasing
importance will be placed on participatory democracy.
Since participatory democracy, civic engagement and social capital are
interrelated concepts, in the future, ANES surveys (or other national surveys) should
strive to capture the multifaceted nature of democracy by distinguishing between
representative democracy and participatory democracy, and by distinguishing among
forms of civic engagement. This effort would improve the empirical strength of the
democracy satisfaction measure and reduce, or possibly resolve the ambiguity of the
measure, and improve the predictive strength of civic engagement variables.
To further understand the fundamental issues affecting people’s satisfaction with
the way democracy works and to fully exploit democracy in community groups,
additional studies using other factors such as: social class, mutual respect; transparency;
inclusiveness in civic bodies and gaps in access to information channels warrant
investigation.
Deth (2002) surveyed several studies and found a lack of empirical evidence for
macro-level interpretations of democratization and social capital conceptualized as
collective good. My study focused on individual level analysis, it too ignored critical
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structural features of social relationship and community level analyses that might have
shown different outcomes. Future research agenda could link contextual community
analysis by measuring and testing community social capital (for example bridging and
bonding social capital) and civic engagement as well as the extent of participatory
democracy in communities. How do these variables impact democracy satisfaction? Also,
how opportunities for participation and social interaction vary from community to
community could be assessed. The capacity of various communities to commit to carry
out certain tasks and the delivery of certain services, may also vary depending on the
levels of satisfaction the citizens feel with the way that democracy works, which affects
meaningful decision making.
Spatial class differences also warrant investigation. The increase in the number of
gated communities, and effect of the new geography of class as proposed by Florida
(2002) where some communities have a concentration of the creative class, while others
are populated by working class and service class people, pose an area of concern for
participatory democracy. Yet another area for contemporary research is religion and
democracy satisfaction, particularly the role of faith-based initiatives in communities
with a high concentration of minorities.

7.4 Limitations of the Study
This research has a few drawbacks relating to data availability that ultimately
limited the rigor of aspects of the statistical testing of my conceptual model. For example,
the index of particularized trust would have been more keenly measured with data that
more precisely ascertained trust among friends and family members.
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The literature is replete with the idea that the chance an individual has to
participate in political problem solving in local communities is often a function of his or
her social status. The ANES data set for thus study included individuals who lived in
privately owned housing. Residents of publicly owned or subsided housing were
excluded are often among the poorest residents of communities. Thus, data were not
available to test all the important dimensions that would signify the capacity constraint of
inequality in the development of social capital and civic participation. In the future,
ANES could consider including residents of publicly owned housing in the sample
population.
Although issues surrounding the negative face of social capital are reasonably
important in terms of the inherent problems they pose for effective participatory
democracy. Not much work has been done in this area.1 Alternative views on social
capital may lead to alterative findings. It would have been insightful therefore, to
introduce and develop the Weberian concept of social closure in the light of the creation
of “bad social capital” and examine how this may impact democracy satisfaction.
However, due to data limitations, by virtue of the fact that social class was self reported
and under reported, this critical analysis was not developed in this dissertation.

1

Scholars such as Berman (1982), Portes and Landolt (1996), Durlauf (1999) and Putnam (2000)
have underscored some negative aspects of social capital. 1 Portes (1998) presents two reasons for
emphasizing the negative side of social capital. One is to avoid a tendency to present community networks,
social capital, and collective sanctions as un-mixed blessings and a second is to keep analyses within the
bounds of serious sociological analysis rather than as moralizing statements.
There are indications of negative normative associations as well as positive ones. Some social
associations symbolize the “negative side” of social capital and have deleterious repercussions for
democratic processes. Calling attention to the negative side of social capital, Bourdieu (1986) argues that
when group members control who join the group, this leads to the exclusion of certain individuals.
Coleman recognizes potential negative manifestations of social capital when he warns, “a given form of
social capital that is valuable in facilitating certain actions may be useless or even harmful for others”
(1988a: S98).

162
Finally, even with these limitations this dissertation points to the scope for local
level analyses through the collection of primary social capital data. Such local studies
should deliberately dissect more precise and ideal measures of trust and civic
engagement, and incorporate measures of social class, religiosity, tolerance and social
closure. Research opportunities exist to advance our understanding of the extent to which
generalized trust (total trusters and general trusters) and particularized trust (particular
trusters and skeptics) are pertinent factors explaining development efforts in local
communities that are deficient in civic culture and participatory democracy.
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